La Jicarita Article on Mixed Waste Landfill

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Citizen Action to NM supplement to NMED MWLF Briefing 5YR Report

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Supplement to the May 2020 NMED Overview ("Briefing")

 

CITIZEN ACTION NEW MEXICO SUPPLEMENT TO

NEW MEXICO ENVIRONMENT DEPARTMENT BRIEFING

FOR SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES MIXED WASTE LANDFILL 5-YEAR REPORT

JULY 20, 2020

1. SUMMARY

Citizen Action New Mexico (“CANM”) and other organizations encourage the New Mexico Environment Department (“NMED”) to issue an order to Sandia National Laboratories’ (“Sandia”) to plan forcleanup of the Mixed Waste Landfill (“dump” or “MWL”) using excavation with offsite disposal.The Cold War legacy dump’s unlined cover, pits and trenches are filled with mixed toxic chemical and radioactive wastes leaking toward Albuquerque’s drinking water aquifer.  The MWL does not meet the protective requirements of federal hazardous waste law.

 

A March 2020 NMED MWL Briefing and five emails were obtained from a CANM public records request.[1]The Briefing misrepresents the Sandia 5-Year Report as solely providing that the current “remedy [of a dirt cover] is protective now and in the future” for “human health and the environment.”NMED’s Briefing omits the 5-Year Report (December 2018) conclusion that excavation and offsite disposal is feasible,the safest and most effective long-term MWL cleanup remedy with disposal pathways for all contaminants. 

 

The public records response shows that NMED has not responded for over a year to the report or public comments requesting NMED action to move forward with MWL cleanup. The NMED has required cleanup of numerous hazardous dumpsites at Sandia in the past.  NMED should protect public health and safety by ordering Sandia to begin a Corrective Measures Implementation Plan (“CMIP“) for cleanup of the MWL.

 

The 2016 NMED Final Order[2] required Sandia to consider two options for the dump in its 5-Year Report:

• excavation with offsite disposal or
• excavation with onsite disposal in a landfill meeting modern legal standards.[3]

In this paper, Citizen Action is supplementing the May 2020 NMED Overview (“Briefing”)[4] for the MWL.  Citizen Action supports excavation and offsite disposal. Benefits of excavation and removal include: 

• Removal of long-term danger to nearby population of Albuquerque from disposal of toxic chemical and radionuclides with half-lives of millions of years from atomic bomb production and testing, nuclear reactor meltdown experiments and military experiments.The wastes will remain toxic for millions of yearsand require perpetual monitoring and maintenance.
• Compared to installing another onsite regulated landfill, excavation with offsite disposal has a lower cost, less risk to workers and the public, will take less time, utilize a smaller footprint, and decrease the amount of time devoted to regulatory issues.
• The risk of contaminants such as Volatile Organic Compounds reaching groundwater is halted by excavation and disposal offsite.
• Removal allows the MWL site and surrounding land to return to residential or industrial use
• No need for permanent inspection, monitoring and maintenance of cover activities
• Financial burdens for removal falls on the federal government and not the State of New Mexico. Costs are uncertain if DOE/SNL leave the Kirtland AFB site.
• Removal of a national security hazard since the MWL is located on a military base with nuclear weapons, 20,000+ personnel, potential terrorist target, aircraft take-offs and landings with fuel loads and live bombs or dropping of bombs like occurred at Mesa del Sol.
• The Fate and Transport analysis fails to consider that the dump is already leaking toxic solvents PCE and TCE to Albuquerque’s drinking water aquifer. Corrective action is necessary to halt the flow of contamination. Would probably require partial or complete cover removal depending on contamination. 
• Removes risk of potential accidents such as the metallic sodium explosions that occurred at Beatty, NV in 2015 that sent a radioactive cloud over four states; removes presence of other incompatible, reactive chemicals and spent fuel elements.
• Removal reduces risk from rupture of the Tijeras sewer line affecting the MWL and its contents.
• No specific emergency plan exists for dump accidents.
• Halts wastes continuing to leak from deteriorating containment such as cardboard boxes, plastic bags, wooden crates, rusting steel drums that can lead to cracking and dirt cover subsidence.

 

The May 2020 NMED Briefing for management did not consider factors concerning the dump that are raised by:

1. The May 26, 2005 Final Order and the 2016 Final Order,
2. Conclusions of the Sandia 5-Year Report[5] confirming the feasibility and preferred option of excavation and offsite disposal,
3. Federal hazardous waste law of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”).
4. History of the MWL and types of toxic chemical and radioactive waste,
5. Defective groundwater monitoring wells(EPA Hotline Report).
6. The dirt cover does not meetRCRA requirements (2006 TechLaw, Inc. report, 2016 Final Order).
7. Public and agency comments. The dump has been an official concern for the US Environmental Protection Agency, the New Mexico Environment Department, the City of Albuquerque Water Protection Advisory Board, independent technical experts and the public requests for cleanup for 20 years by attending hearings, filing thousands of letters and comments, presenting expert witnesses and lawsuits.

 

The 2015 expert testimony[6] of Dr. Michael Barcelona, Ph.D., stated:

“The [MWL] cover will not last sufficient time considering the persistence for millennia of the Mixed Waste Landfill contents. The use of a dirt cover without a liner beneath the cover and the waste is completely worthless.  [R]elease can be expected to increase over time as containers break down, making it necessary to consider timely excavation of the wastes. Dirt covers can increase the transport of some chlorinated solvents, perchloroethylene, trichloroethylene, PCBs, to the groundwater.Radioactive wastes such as plutonium can travel to the groundwater in colloidal form, that means suspended, not dissolved, but suspended in the fluid.”

 

Citizen Action sees no reason why DOE/Sandia should not begin developing a CMIP to submit to NMED.  However, Sandia needs an order from NMED to proceed.  The current 678 page 5-Year Report contains descriptions from 2003 and 2018 for how excavation and offsite removal would be safely accomplished for workers and the public.  Leaving the dump in place cannot be considered a final remedy given that the 2005 Final Order requires Sandia to consider the feasibility of excavation every five years, monitor, maintain the cover and respond to public comments.  Several of the radionuclides have half-lives from hundreds to millions of years. Installing another onsite landfill would continue the need for possible removal and still require continuing inspections, monitoring and maintenance. 

 

Citizen Action requests that NMED issue an Order to DOE/Sandia to begin a Corrective Measures Implementation Plan (“CMIP”) for excavation with offsite disposal. The MWL does not meet RCRA Subtitle C requirements for its dirt cover.[7]DOE/Sandia supports the offsite alternative for several reasons discussed below. 

 

1. THE PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST

 

Citizen Action sent a May 26, 2020 public records request[8] to find out 1) what NMED is considering in light of Sandia’s statement that NMED approval of a Corrective Measures implementation Plan (“CMIP”) would start cleanup of the MWL, and 2) what response there might be to the hundreds of public comments/letters/petitions requesting such action.

 

The NMED response to CANM for its May 26, 2020 public records request include an 11 page March 2020 power point SNL Mixed Waste Landfill Overview (“Briefing”) and five emails. As of December 2018 when the 5-Year Report was submitted, Sandia estimated it could begin the CMIP planning process by 6/30/2020. (Pg. D 3-11). There are no emails or other documents showing that NMED made efforts during the 1½ year period fromDecember 2018to May 2020 to consider the DOE/Sandia recommendations of excavation and offsite disposal.[9]Understandably, there have been NMED concerns for the Covid-19 situation, budget cuts, new staffing with loss of institutional memory about the MWL, and opposition to the HOLTEC licensing.

 

The 2005 Final Order requires repeated 5-year Reports from Sandia regarding the feasibility of excavation and continued consideration of the effectiveness of the dirt cover remedy.The 2005 Final Order for the MWL requires that citizens be granted a comment period for each 5-Year Report and that the NMED respond to citizen comments.[10]

 

Citizen Action Comments and hundreds of public comments for the 5-Year Reportsubmitted in July 2019[11]requested that the NMED issue Sandia National Laboratories an Order for a Corrective Implementation Plan to Sandia National Laboratories to excavate and dispose off-site the mixed radioactive and hazardous waste in the Mixed Waste Landfill (“dump”).   Sandia states (p. 5-13):

The regulatory authority for modification of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act [RCRA] Permit would be the NMED, and the EPA would be the regulatory authority for the project-specific TSCA Permit Application.[12]

 

NMED has not responded to public comments for the December 2018Sandia 5-Year Report.

On February 12, 2020, CANM requested a meeting with NMED Secretary James Kenney to discuss the 5-Year Report.  No meeting was held with Citizen Action and other groups.  On February 28, 2020 after Citizen Action’s request for a meeting, NMED Kevin Pierard, Chief Hazardous Waste Bureau asked David Cobrain for a briefing.  The briefing was arranged for March 19, 2020 by Naomi Davidson Environmental Scientist. The public comment period ended on July 23, 2019. NMED has not provided response to public comments.[13]NMED has had the SNL 5-Year Report since December 2018 since which time it could have at least preliminarily considered the Report, even issued an order for a CMIP. 

If the NMED does not issue an Order to proceed with excavation and offsite disposal, CANM requests that 1) the NMED provide its reasons for why it should not issue such an Order and 2) provide reasonably timely written responses to the public comments that were provided to NMED during the comment period for the 5-Year Report of the MWL.

NMED has known since at least the 2016 Final Order and well before that the MWL remains in non-compliance with RCRA and that the dirt cover remedy cannot be considered complete.  The February 12, 2016 NMED Final Order (Flynn) required: “1) evaluation of excavation, removal and appropriate disposal of all waste in the MWL and; 2) construction and installation of a modern landfill, which shall at a minimum include a RCRA Subtitle C liner system, an ET cover with bio-intrusion barrier, and appropriate post-closure controls and monitoring.”[14]

The remedy of a dirt cover cannot remain effective because the dump lacks a RCRA liner. 

 

The NMED Secretary’s 2016 Final Order specifies that the 2005 remedy may not be “appropriate”:

The MWL is located just outside of New Mexico’s largest metropolitan area and does not meet modern environmental standards for disposing of hazardous waste.  Specifically, even though the MWL is referred to as a landfill, it does not utilize a RCRA Subtitle C liner system (a double composite liner with leak detection). Instead, the waste at the MWL is buried in unlined pits.  … [T]he final remedy selected in 2005 (ET cover with bio-intrusion barrier) may not be the most appropriate long-term solution for this site.  Absent complete excavation and off-site disposal, installation of a RCRA[15] Subtitle C liner system would be the most protective, modern design for a mixed waste landfill.

 

At the 2015 Corrective Action Complete (“CAC”) public hearing,CANM presented substantial evidence that:

• The dump had a worthless dirt cover without liners and leachate collection;
• In 2007 NMED brought a lawsuit to keep Citizen Action from obtaining the 2006 TechLaw, Inc. report about the unsuitability of the MWL dirt cover and the Fate and transport Model for long-term protection before NMED installed that remedy (See pp. 13-14 infra);
• A history of defective groundwater monitoring; Collusion existed between NMED and the USEPA to wrongfully hide information under claims of “national security” that the dump did not have groundwater monitoring wells installed that furnish reliable, accurate data to justify selection of the 2005 dirt cover remedy. (See pp. 10-12 infra)
• Volatile Organic Compounds (“VOCs”)are being released from MWL pits and trenches;
• Illegal spent fuel rod disposalfrom nuclear reactor meltdown testing and nuclear rocket fuel safety program (High-level Waste); Seventy-one (71) cu yds. of TRU waste was disposed of that requires deep geological disposal. Appendix H Table J-1 (See fn 12).
• Disposal of explosive metallic sodium.Explosions occurred at a similar dump at Beatty, NVin October 2015 after the CAC hearing concluded as CANM warns could happen for the MWL;
• Heavy metals disposal such as Mercury, Lead, Plutonium, Uranium, incompatible chemical wastes and unknown chemical disposal in the Classified section;
• Two uranium fires;
• 270,000 gallons of reactor waste water disposed in trenches;

 

• THE NMED BRIEFING MISREPRESENTS THE 5-YEAR REPORT AND IGNORES STAKEHOLDER CONCERNS

 

The March 2020 NMED Briefing misrepresentsthe 5-Year Report as solely providing that the current “remedy [of a dirt cover] is protective now and in the future” for “human health and the environment.”Indeed, that is contrary to statements in the 2016 Final Order and the 5-Year Report.  This statement also ignores that the MWL is a very dangerous dump next to Albuquerque’s urban setting on a military base with more than 20,000 employees, their families, schools, hospitals, airport and major transportation routes.  The Briefing omits that according to the 2016 NMED Final Order, the MWL dump does not meet RCRA Subtitle C requirements for having a liner system and does not have a qualified RCRA “cap.”Clearly, the Briefing requires revision and inclusion of stakeholders concerns. 

 

Contrary to the NMED Briefing, Sandia’s 5-Year Report concludes that:

• excavation and offsite disposal is safe,
• cost effective and
• There are disposal pathways for all of the hazardous and radioactive chemicals.
• The footprint requirements for any staging of materials would be considerably smaller using the offsite disposal option.
• Exceedance of regulatory standards for worker safetyis unlikely
• Concern for groundwater contamination from excavation considered unlikely
• MWL is not “too hot” to excavate

 

The NMED Briefing omits the important conclusion of the 5-Year Report that complete excavation with off-site disposalis a feasible, safe, and cost effective alternative with disposal pathways for all of the dump’s toxic chemicals and long-lived radioactive wastes.  If a new landfill were to be installed at Sandia, disposing of the chemical and radioactive wastes would still require a regulated landfill with monitoring, a later second excavation and off-site removal.  NMED should require DOE/Sandia to identify the offsite disposal locations. 

 

The 5-Year Report states that the preferred alternative is excavation with offsite disposal as a remedy rather than the onsite disposal alternative(ES p. iii):

The 2018 excavation feasibility evaluation updates the 2003 evaluation and includes both the offsite and onsite disposal alternatives. Advances in technology since 2003 have not fundamentally changed the excavation and waste management approach. However, radiological decay, use of a more conventional excavation approach, and a streamlined waste management approach represent significant changes. In addition, long-term onsite storage of excavated waste was eliminated for the 2018 evaluation becausethere are current disposal pathways for all anticipated waste streams. (Emphasis supplied).

 

Section 5.4 -- Comparison of Offsite and Onsite Disposal Alternatives

For this Five-Year Report, complete excavation with disposal in an onsite engineered cell with a RCRA Subtitle C liner was evaluated along with offsite disposal. The fundamental technical approach and requirements for both disposal alternatives are very similar. Onsite disposal is a viable alternative, with the primary benefit of reduction in transportation risk. However, with this alternative comes the long-term costs and liability of maintaining a permitted disposal facility.  Given the current availability of offsite disposal options, this would be the preferred disposal alternative. As the evaluation of onsite disposal was specific to this first Five-Year Report, subsequent Five-Year Reports will not evaluate onsite disposal.  (Emphasis supplied).

 

The 5-Year Report Section 5.3.6 Summary states the criteria used to evaluate offsite disposal with the onsite disposal alternative as follows:

“A reevaluation of the complete excavation alternative with offsite disposal was conducted in accordance with the NMED Final Orders (NMED May 2005 and February 2016) and MWL

LTMMP (SNL/NM March 2012) requirements. The 2018 evaluation presents updates to the

2003 evaluation[16], including excavation and waste management technologies and approaches, waste disposal pathways, site worker risk, and cost. In addition, the 2018 evaluation includes the onsite disposal alternative in an engineered cell with a RCRA Subtitle C liner system and an ET cover. The evaluation followed the same approach as presented in the 2003 MWL CMS Final Report (SNL/NM May 2003) and is based on the following criteria:

• Long-term reliability and effectiveness
• Reduction of toxicity, mobility, or volume of wastes
• Short-term effectiveness
• Implementability
• Cost”

 

One internal NMED email[17] in the public records response to CANM opines, without any evidentiary basis, that the writer thinks “the MWL is too hot to excavate at this point.”  Sandia’s conclusion is otherwise. The expiration of several half-lives has occurred for radionuclides such as Tritium and Cobalt-60 so that the excavation could proceed (5.3.3.4).

“Consistent with the 2003 evaluation, physical risks associated with transportation and remediation construction far exceed the chemical or radionuclide exposure risk associated with excavation and waste management activities. The substantial decay of some radionuclides, in particular cobalt-60 and tritium, has decreased the overall site worker radiological exposure risk.”

Additionally, there is access to robotic equipment. (5.3.4.4):

“The conveyor system in the Debris Segregation & Management Sprung™ would be equipped with radiation sensors, an overhead crane, and robotic manipulators to allow for remote segregation of higher hazard items.”

 

The 2016 Final Order concern for worker risk from excavation is mitigated.There are available means for decreasing any occupational hazards due to excavation of the site through the use of both conventional and remote controlled robotic equipment. Sandia states (p. 5-6):

Risk to site workers would be a primary concern for the multi-year duration of excavation and waste management activities. In addition to performing activities in ventilated Sprungs™, worker risk mitigations would include detailed planning, use of Level B personal protective equipment (PPE) with supplied-air full-face respirators, real time monitoring with alarms and action levels, use of distance and shielding, and limiting time of exposure to radiation.

Section 5.3.3:

The MWL inventory would be used to develop trench/pit-specific plans and waste profiles to minimize waste handling and processing steps, simplify the waste management process, and reduce site worker risk. Most work duties would be performed in Level B PPE with supplied air full-face respirators or in supplied-air, sealed equipment cabs. Excavation and waste management activities would be performed in ventilated Sprungs™ and include dust control measures. All vented air from the Sprung™ structures would be filtered through high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters. This approach would help mitigate the hazards from airborne particulates, but would not be effective for removal of VOCs and tritium vapor. Based upon the 2003 evaluation, these inhalation hazards were not a major health and safety concern, as VOCs occur at very low concentrations and the inhalation hazard for tritium was not a significant risk concern.

Section 5.3.3.1:

The Future Excavation radiological risk screening results provide a conservative estimate of potential site worker risk for the purpose of this evaluation and demonstrate that exceedance of the applicable regulatory limit in 10 CFR 835 “Occupational Radiation Protection” of 5,000 mrem/year per worker is unlikely. Adherence to DOE and SNL/NM dose guidelines is achievable following ALARA principles using sound health physics-based approaches (i.e., hazard mitigation planning and controls) as previously described in Section 5.3.3.

Section 5.3.4.3

The Classified Area approach integrates the use of remote operations and specialized equipment to mitigate site worker risk. Whenever possible, intact shielding would be left surrounding radiation sources and higher-activity items. Special shielding, standard waste containers, and remote-handling equipment would be used to safely manage and process smaller items with radiation or other hazards.

Section 5.3.4.4

[T]he waste characterization process would begin prior to excavation during the Permitting & Planning phase. Available information for each trench and pit would be evaluated to determine waste profiles and streamline the waste characterization process. This approach would be designed to minimize, to the extent possible, site worker risk throughout the waste management process while meeting acceptance criteria for disposal.

 

The 2016 Final Order (p. 7) has the concern that excavation would cause further contamination of the groundwater.  That isconsidered unlikely by Sandia (at Section ES iii):

The updated, simplistic model that conservatively maximizes transport to groundwater predicts VOC soil-vapor concentrations will continue to decrease over time and are unlikely to impact groundwater.

 

A more thorough Briefing analysis of the 5-Year Report would consider the important factors for public concerns, the history of the dump, leakage of toxic contents, regulatory requirements, benefits of cleanup of the dump and changes to the assumptions in the 2016 Final Order.Sandia now states (5-Year Report Section 5.4) that the preferred alternative is excavation with offsite disposal as a remedy rather than the onsite disposal alternative.   This is the same alternative that the public argued for in public hearings in December 2004.  Instead:

• MWL is a non-RCRA dump without liners below the pits and trenches and the dirt cover.
• NMED lawsuit against CANM to suppress evidence against the flawed dirt cover remedy, lack of transparency (2006 TechLaw, Inc.)
• Leaving dangerous waste in place; the unknown contents of the MWL, especially in the Classified area (WERC, Nuttall, DOE/Sandia Memoranda) including presence of high-level radioactive waste, TRU waste, explosive metallic sodium and other incompatible chemicals.
• MWL should have been classified as a “regulated unit” with a closure and post-closure plan since it received RCRA hazardous waste after July 26, 1982 (June 11, 1998 NMED Dinwiddie letter to DOE Zamorski – “demonstrate equivalency with post-closure care requirements”). https://www.radfreenm.org/index.php/sandia-national-laboratories-mixed-waste-lanfill/mwl-regulatory/80-affidavit-robert-dinwiddie-in-support-of-enforcing-mwl-5-year-review
• Defective groundwater monitoring wells and unreliable data (Moats and Winn, NODs, Gilkeson, see fn 18)
• Potential for accidents including explosions such as occurred at Beatty, NV from metallic sodium. The failure of SNL to furnish information regarding the sodium/uranium loading facility has been brought to NMED’s attention but with no agency pursuit of the information.
• Fate and Transport Modeling does not consider leakage and accidents,
• Leaking to Albuquerque’s aquifer is now occurring with no corrective action.
• The site and its surroundings will remain unusable for industrial or residential use.

 

The Briefing does not describe the toxicity of the dump’s wastes.The Department of Energy’s unlined dump contains hundreds of long-lived radionuclides, solvents, and heavy metals in unlined pits and trenches leaking to Albuquerque’s drinking water aquifer. These are the most toxic types of waste on the planet from nuclear weapons production, nuclear reactor meltdown testing, atomic bomb testing, nuclear rocket testing and the military:  Examples of waste disposal from more than 5000 Radioactive and Toxic Material disposal sheets include: spent fuel ends, fuel rods, 119 drums of Plutonium and Americium contaminated waste, TRU waste, large quantities of multiple fission products (MFP), often along with beryllium, lithium, lead, liquid mercury (10 gallon metal drum 7 June 1971 buried in Pit 25), nickel-63, metallic sodium, Lead Azide and Lithium (explosives), Plutonium-238, -239, Americium 241, hundreds of tons of Depleted Uranium-238, Uranium 235 (2 September 1971- 85 kg buried in Trench 25), Thorium, Cesium-137, Strontium-90, Iodine-131,Tantalum, Vanadium isotope, Gold-198, cadmium, tritium in liquid and solid form, barrels and containers of unknown quantities of toxic chemicals including chlorinated solvents such as PCB, PCE, TCE, toluene, organic resins. 

Chlorinated solvents, such as PCE and TCE, are very close to or already entering Albuquerque’s drinking water aquifer.

 

1. THE NMED BRIEFING CONTINUES TO IGNORERECORDS ABOUTTHE DEFECTIVE GROUNDWATER MONITORINGWELL DATA, THE INEFFECTIVEREMEDY OF A DIRT COVER AND STAKEHOLDER MEETINGS THAT VIOLATE ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

 

USEPA, NMED and DOE/Sandiahave a history of knowingly hiding and omitting documents, and decision-making based on materially false and misleading data and omissions.

 

DEFECTIVE GROUNDWATER MONITORING WELL DATA

It is important to recognize that the MWL groundwater monitoring well data did not support the selection of the 2005 remedy of the dirt cover.[18][19]The Long-Term Monitoring and Maintenance Plan (“LTMMP”) was also approved based on information from defective groundwater monitoring wells. NMED Notices of Deficiency[20] showed that DOE, Sandia, and NMED knew all along that the groundwater monitoring network of seven groundwater monitoring wells installed beginning in 1989 did not supply reliable, representative data to support installation of the dirt cover as a remedy made by the 2005 Final Order.  Yet the false and misleading groundwater well monitoring data was submitted at all permitting proceedings to the present to continue the remedy of the dirt cover that is not RCRA qualified.  Such presentation of false and misleading data constitutes clear violation of RCRA.  (42 U.S.C. 6928(d) (3))

InMay 2007 CANM made a complaint about the defective MWL groundwater monitoring network to the USEPA. An April 14, 2010 EPA Office of Inspector General Hotline Report identifiedEPA staff concerns for defective groundwater monitoring that the EPA Region 6 management and NMED colluded to hide from Citizen Action and the public.  The concerns were hidden in an EPA technical Oversight Review.   https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201510/documents/20100414-10-p-0100.pdf[21]EPA Region 6 lied to CANM that no such technical report existed.  However, NMED Will Moats received a draft copy of the EPA Oversight Review in 2007 attached to an email from EPA Richard Maher[22] that described the defective groundwater monitoring wells at the MWL.  Mr. Moats never placed the oversight document in the administrative record for the public to see even though he knew the document described defects found in his earlier Notices of Deficiencies[23] and CANM’s complaint.[24]

According to the EPA Inspector General, NMED made an agreement with the technical staff at EPA Region 6 to not document conversations between NMED and EPA Region 6 regarding the MWL dump monitoring well network. The agreement was made so that Citizen Action could not obtain documentation regarding the discussions. Concerns in the EPA Region 6 Oversight Report for the groundwater monitoring well network were orally conveyed to NMED so that Citizen Action could not see the Oversight Report and know the EPA concerns. (http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2010/20100414-10-P-0100.pdf, at p.3). The EPA Hotline Report stated (p. 4-5):

[T]he Project Engineer for Sandia intentionally did not document concerns with NMED’s management of the MWL monitoring wells specifically to withhold the information from the public.

… In five cases, EPA rescinded its recommendations with regard to the MWL monitoring wells in favor of NMED’s proposed plan. Although the Region told us the issues were resolved orally (meetings, conference calls, and individual phone calls), the Region was unable to provide any documentation to support or document the rationale for these compromises. We found that one Oversight Review team member felt the team was pushed to agree with NMED’s position regarding the MWL monitoring wells.

Thus, EPA and NMED colluded to prevent public participation and to withhold relevant facts from the public during the RCRA process for corrective measures. Withholding relevant facts and reports allowed NMED and DOE/Sandia to proceed with constructing the dirt cover without the opposition from an informed public with full access to the facts.[25]

Citizen Action again sued (August 8, 2011)EPA Region 6 and the EPA Inspector General to obtain the EPA Region 6 Oversight Review wrongly labelled “CONFIDENTIAL.” The Oversight Review and hundreds of other documents containedthe EPA staff concerns that NMED and the USEPA hid from the publicabout the defective MWL groundwater monitoring wells and unreliable data. EPA Region 6 staff concerns fundamentally echoed CANM concerns. 

 

Finally in late 2012, as result of the second FOIA lawsuit, Citizen Action obtained some 20 different versions of the Region 6 EPA Oversight Review, five years after the initial 2007 complaint about the defective ground water monitoring well network at the MWL. 

 

The EPA Inspector General Auditorsdocumented interviews of Region 6 technical staff as part of the Oversight Review cited in the Hotline Report indicated that the team’s initial analysis of the MWL groundwater monitoring network would not have supported the “solution” [of a dirt cover].  According to the Region 6 technical staff person, as the Region 6 drafts reviews were rewritten, NMED pushed “extremely hard” on EPA Region 6 not to question the past results of groundwater monitoring and not to review the decision for the dirt cover “solution” of leaving hazardous wastes in place at the MWL.  Over 20 drafts of the Region 6 Oversight Review were written to make changes that would make it appear that groundwater monitoring and decision making for the MWL had been properly made by NMED.  The Oversight Report and the EPA Auditor reviews were not obtained until after Citizen Action filed a FOIA lawsuit. 

 

The 12/12/2007 EPA Region 6 Program Oversight Review 12 page letter stamped “Confidential” contained significant technical paragraphs that were deleted from the three page 12/13/2007 letter that was sent to Citizen Action. One deleted paragraph stated:

The decision to cover the MWL was made to reduce the potential for erosion, water infiltration, and animal intrusion; it is not ‘Final Closure’ with a permanent RCRA ‘cap.’  … The potential exists for future excavation if deemed necessary. 

 

The 2005 Final Order requires that

[T]he report [5-Year Report] shall detail all efforts to ensure any future releases or movement of contaminants are detected and addressed well before any effect on groundwater or increased risk to public health or the environment.

Evidence at the 2015Corrective Action Complete hearing showed that volatile organic solvents leaked from the dump to at least within 50 ft. of groundwater beneath the dump. No corrective action has been taken to halt the escape of contaminants from the unlined pits and trenches. 

 

The April 20, 2005 Final Order states in pertinent part (p. 5, ¶ 5):

NMED shall provide a process whereby members of

the public may comment on the report and its conclusions, and shall respond to

those comments in its final approval of the report.

NMED still conceals the April 2010 EPA Hotline Report by not placing it in the administrative record for the MWL as has been done for other MWL legal decisions.  (42 U.S.C. 6928(d)(4)).Obviously, when the facts are hidden from the public there can be no meaningful opportunity for public comment and agency responses become merely pro forma without real substance.  Decisions are made without genuine public participation.  Administrative due process is denied and the Administrative Procedures Act is violated.  (5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559).

The EPA Hotline Report statesthe public involvement policy that is also applicable to NMED as a program manager (Hotline Report at p. 4):

EPA’s Public Involvement Policy instructs EPA managers and staff to ‘work to ensure that decision-making processes are open and accessible to all interested groups.’ This policy also instructs EPA to approach all decision making with a bias in favor of significant and meaningful public involvement. The Region’s actions do not do that.

NMED is still allowing the use of three of the original known defective groundwater monitoring wells at the MWL.

• MW4 with its two screens served as a conduit for Contaminants to migrate between the different zones of saturation. Well MW4 was installed to investigate groundwater contamination below Trench D because of the disposal of 271,500 gallons of reactor coolant water in the trench. The purpose of well MW4 was to investigate contamination at the water table beneath Trench D. However, the top screen in well MW4 was installed too deep below the water table, and the well has not met its important purpose to investigate contamination at the water table. The bottom screen in well MW4 is installed across the contact of the AF sediments with the ARG strata.
• MWL-MW5 is screened across the Alluvial Fan (AF) and the Ancient Rio Grande (ARG) strata. MW5 can serve as a conduit for cross contamination between these different zones of saturation.
• Well MW6 is in the productive groundwater strata but is 500 ft. distant to the northwest corner from the dump. MW6 cannot yield high quality, representative samples because of its great distance from the MWL dump. MW6 does not meet its intended purpose to monitor releases from the MWL dump and groundwater as defined by the Consent Order.

Although three of the older groundwater monitoring wells were replaced by MWL-MW7, -MW8 and -MW9, the work plans and the installation of the new groundwater monitoring wells were not presented to the public prior to approval and installation.  40 CFR 270.42 and Appendix I – Classification of Permit Modification-- section C. GroundWater Protection, sections 1-8 thereto.

 

The erroneous low water levels measured in the three new monitoring wells MWL-MW7, -MW8 and -MW9 that represent a sudden decline in the water table of approximately 20 feet are because of mistakes in the drilling method, drilling operations and the 30-foot length of the well screens.[26]

 

THE DIRT COVER “CAP” IS UNQUALIFIED UNDER RCRA AND NOT A PROTECTIVE REMEDY

The MWL is an unlined dumpsite that is in violation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act because it lacks the required liners beneath a qualified RCRA “cap” and a liner beneath the pits and trenches of the dump. There is no system for leachate collection.  The dirt cover cannot be a “final remedy” because dirt covers always fail from subsidence, erosion, lack of maintenance and other factors.  A dirt cover can also speed the transport of VOCs and other chemicals to groundwater.[27]Even small earthquakes can affect a dirt cover and lead to cracking, subsidenceand entry of water causing explosions as occurred at Beatty, NV.[28]

The MWL is leaking its contents toward Albuquerque’s drinking water aquifer and cannot contain its contents for the period of time that such hazardous and radioactive waste will remain toxic and endanger public health and safety. 

 

NMED knew from a 2006 TechLaw, Inc. report that the MWL dirt cover would not be a protective remedy as required by RCRA.[29]When CANM sought the TechLaw report in a 2006 public records request, NMED sued CANM and claimed “executive privilege” to prevent the TechLaw document from being acquired.[30]The 2006 TechLaw, Inc. document was finally obtained in 2009 after the Court dismissal of the NMED lawsuit.[31]TechLaw, Inc. reported to NMED about the unprotective features of the dirt cover before it was installed at the MWL.  The TechLaw report also described the uselessness of the Fate and Transport Model. 

NMED still has not placed the 2006 TechLaw, Inc. report and the Court of Appeals decision releasing the document in the MWL administrative record as has been done for other MWL legal decisions.  (42 U.S.C. 6928(d)(4)). 

Although the 2016 Final Order (p. 4-5)mentions the “ill-considered” NMED lawsuit against CANM, the TechLaw report and its significance for the defective dirt cover remedy are conspicuously unstated.The TechLaw report rejected dirt cover durability for the necessary time period (1000 years), lack of liners, the absence of moisture monitoring beneath the cover, the lack of a membrane to remove water to the sides of the cover, and the lack of leachate collection capability. TechLaw rejected the Fate and Transport Model labeling it a “Black Box“for its unusable computer codes. CANM was denied valuable information during the period of negotiations for the Fate and Transport Model that were a requirement of the 2005 Final Order. 

The 2016 Final Order describes the NMED public records lawsuit as “ill conceived”without mentioning the name of TechLaw and the flaws described by the 2006 TechLaw, Inc. report (P. 4-5). But the delay imposed by the NMED lawsuit against releasing the TechLaw report allowed the installation of the dirt cover to proceed without addressing the problems with the dirt cover remedy.  The 2016 Final Order also states:

“The essence of Dr. Nuttall’s testimony is that NMED still does not definitively understand what was buried in the MWL and therefore the final remedy selected in 2005 is not protective of human health and the environment.”

Dr. Nuttall’s2015 sworn technical testimony was quite clearin stating that DOE/Sandia intentionally deceived WERC and the NMED about high level waste and metallic sodium that is buried in the MWL and that represents an ongoing threat:[32]

If the WERC panel had known of the nature of the mixed High-level wastes and the capacity of Sandia for safe, remote, robotic excavation, the conclusions of the WERC would have been far different.  The information presented to WERC was intentionally deceptive and supportive of Sandia’s concealed plan generated in 1997-98 by Sandia management to never excavate the MWL.  The current plan places the MWL under long-term stewardship and circumvents the 5-year report requirement of the Final Order for consideration of excavation.  Ultimately, Sandia intends to leave the MWL wastes only subject to institutional controls and that violates the 5-year report consideration. 

 

The issue of HWL waste within the MWL was of concern. Sandia National Laboratory denied ever having conducted experiments using uranium fuel pins. Sandia stated that the only fuel pins at SNL were in the ACRR (Annular Core Research Reactor) and those were regulated by the NRC.  In fact, NRC has not had regulatory authority over the ACRR.  Sandia’s statement of denial redirected the questioning of the WERC panel away from the issue of HLW disposal in the MWL.  Hence the topic was not further investigated by either WERC panel and misled the conclusions of the two panels. Sodium was listed in the inventory descriptions and was identified as metallic sodium, but Sandia refused to disclose how the metallic sodium had been or disposed of.  The refusal to state how the metallic sodium was used further misled the WERC panel review.  This appears to have been premeditated deception regarding the use of sodium in the meltdown experiments for studying the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) in which sodium was used as a coolant.  The WERC panel was also deceived as to the risk assessment for the MWL.  In the Phase 2 RCRA Facility investigation, sodium was described only as an “Essential nutrient” and it was not disclosed that it was mixed inseparably in the experiments.  

 

Findings through FOIA documents and careful review of SAND reports showed that Sandia had extensively conducted nuclear reactor meltdown experiments. The disposal sheets were never shown to the panel and the conclusions of WERC would likely have been different, i.e. requiring Sandia to excavate the MWL. The disposal sheets were not shown to NMED and Roger Kennett for his report.  NMED was unaware of the disposal sheets until April 2015.  The different conclusion would have been made by the WERC panels because it would have been shown that the MWL contained Mixed High-Level Waste that would have contained metallic sodium intimately mixed with Enriched Uranium-235, and multiple fission products.  A disposal sheet that I will show in the slide presentation refers to a fuel pin.[33]

 

The 2018 5-Year Report offers an opportunity to move forward for cleanup of the MWL that the NMED should not lose.  A major problem with environmental analysis for the MWL is that the past unspoken goal of the NMED and DOE/Sandia was to leave the MWL waste in place under the dirt cover and avoid the broader issues requiring MWL clean closure.  To achieve the goal, the administrative public hearings rejected, discounted, minimized and ignored federal law, experts, evidence, comments and issues presented by the public.  Public concerns and expert technical evidence were disregarded and superseded by the administrative political goals.  For the MWL, agency presentations were adopted and approved by hearing officers selected by and favorable to the agency,or even from within the NMED, reciting the evidence of the agency witnesses as conclusive in their findings of fact. 

 

NMED statements to protect New Mexico from the disposal of all the nation’s nuclear reactor waste at Holtec starkly contrast witha decades long delay to issue an order for cleanup of the 2.6 acre Mixed Waste Landfill that is an existingsource of contamination along with the Kirtland AFB jet fuel spill.

Respectfully submitted,

David B. McCoy, Executive Director

Citizen Action New Mexico

This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

 

 

ATTACHMENT A -- NMED BRIEFING

 

ATTACHMENT B -- EMAILS

• From: dave mccoy Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2020 10:44 PM To: Stringer, Stephanie, NMENV Cc: Sam Weisberg ; Eric Nuttall ; Janet Greenwald/CARD ; Leona Morgan ; Eileen Shaughnessy ; CCNS/Joni Arends Subject: [EXT] SNL Mixed Waste Landfill

Dear Stephanie, It has been over a year since Sandia National Laboratories submitted its 5-Year Report for the Mixed Waste Landfill. There have been no updates or responses to comments by Citizen Action or the public regarding our request for the NMED to issue an Order to SNL to begin the process for excavation and cleanup of the MWL. We would like to meet with the NMED regarding this matter. Thank you. Best Wishes, Dave McCoy, Executive Director Citizen Action New Mexico 818 448-9981

• From: Stringer, Stephanie, NMENV Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2020 9:23 AM To: Pierard, Kevin, NMENV Subject: FW: [EXT] SNL Mixed Waste Landfill Kevin,

Another item on our list. We can discuss when you get back. It looks like the HWB Used Oil Bill has died. It is not getting scheduled and numerous groups came out in opposition. It also had a third committee scheduled, which is usually a very bad sign. I hope all is going well. -Stephanie

• From: Pierard, Kevin, NMENV To: Cobrain, Dave, NMENV Subject: FW: [EXT] SNL Mixed Waste Landfill Date: Monday, February 17, 2020 8:17:16 AM

I need a briefing on the MWL sometime this week.

• On Thu, Feb 27, 2020 at 5:02 PM -0700, "Stringer, Stephanie, NMENV" wrote:

Kevin, Can I ask you to take lead on getting this meeting set up (please include me on the invite) as well as an internal meeting for you, me and other staff as appropriate prior to meeting with Mr. McCoy? Thanks, -Stephanie

• From: Pierard, Kevin, NMENV To: Stringer, Stephanie, NMENV Subject: Re: [EXT] SNL Mixed Waste Landfill Date: Thursday, February 27, 2020 5:23:29 PM

Sure. I think the MWL is too hot to excavate at this point and little leakage but that doesn’t explain the lack of a response. I’ll contact Dave just to let him know we’re looking into it and commit to get back to him. I’ll set up the internal meeting for us on this as well.

• On February 28, 2020 email from Kevin Pierard, Chief Hazardous Waste Bureau to David Cobrain stated: “Please set up a briefing for me and Stephanie on SNL specifically related to the MWL. Background info and 5 year review will be of greatest interest. Some time in the next few weeks is fine. thanks”
• From: Pierard, Kevin, NMENV To: Stringer, Stephanie, NMENV Subject: SNL - MWL / Triassic park Date: Tuesday, March 31, 2020 2:26:05 PM SNL-MWL –

Dave should have the draft RTC and approval letter to me by mid-April for my review. Triassic Park – Permit issuance will require a hearing. Apparently there has not been budget for this for the past two years. If our fiscal 21 budget includes sufficient resources we can move this permit. We anticipate needing approx. $75K for the hearing. The attorney on this has left so we will need another attorney assigned and we will need to get folks here geared up. In addition EPA just cut our grant funding for FY20 by $30K.

• From: Davidson, Naomi, NMENV To: Cobrain, Dave, NMENV

Subject: MWL presentation

Date: Thursday, March 19, 2020 1:59:43 PM

Attachments: MWL Briefing 2020.pptx

Naomi Davidson Environmental Scientist

New Mexico Environment Department  Hazardous Waste Bureau

District 1 Office 121 Tijeras Ave NE, Suite 1000

Albuquerque, NM

87102 (505) 222-9504 (w)

(505) 222-9510 (f) This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..

us www.env.nm.gov/HWB/

• From: Cobrain, Dave, NMENV This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.Sent: Tuesday, May 5, 2020 11:41 AM

To: Tavarez, Isreal L. This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Subject: Sandia National Laboratory Mixed Waste Landfill Air Monitoring data

Isreal,

It’s been a while since we were in a Kirtland fuel spill meeting at the same time.  This is a question on a different issue.  Are you aware of any air monitoring data collected for the Sandia National Laboratory Mixed Waste Landfill?

I hope you’re getting through all this COVID-related disruption. Thanks.

Dave Cobrain

 

New Mexico Environment Department

Hazardous Waste Bureau

2905 Rodeo Park Drive East Bldg 1

From: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

To:      This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Subject:            [EXT] RE: Sandia National Laboratory Mixed Waste Landfill Air Monitoring data

Date:  Friday, May 8, 2020 3:23:25 PM

• Attachments: png

Dave,

No, I am not aware of any air monitoring data collected for the Sandia National Laboratory Mixed

Attachment C– Email of EPA Richard Mayer to NMED William Moats

 

 

 

 

[1]The May 26, 2020 CANM Public Records Request was for the following:

All documents whether drafts or in final form of notes, phone logs, calendars, drafts, telephone messages, time tables, electronic or written by other means related to the NMED evaluation of the Sandia National Laboratories 2018 5-Year Review for the Mixed Waste Landfill;

1. NMED or SNL review/responses to all public comments received;
2. Any records of consultations or documents whether internal to NMED or sent to or received from SNL or other state or federal entities with respect to the MWL 5-Year Review;
3. Records related to assignment of duties of NMED personnel or outside contractors to the above items.

[2] 2016 Final Order https://hwbdocuments.env.nm.gov/Sandia%20National%20Labs/2016-02-12%20Final%20Order%20-%20MWL.pdf

[3]The 2016 Final Order states in pertinent part (p. 8):

 [W]ith this Order, the scope of the five-year review and Feasibility Report is now expanded to require the evaluation of the installation of a RCRA Subtitle C liner system in addition to the evaluation of excavation, removal and disposal of all of the waste in the MWL.

[4] See Briefing Attachment A

[5] Sandia National Laboratories 12/14/2018 5-Year Report https://hwbdocuments.env.nm.gov/Sandia%20National%20Labs/2018-12-14%20MWL%205%20Year%20Report.pdf

[6]July 10, 2015 Proposed Permit Modification Corrective Action Complete Transcript pp. 878-79

[7]See 40 CFR 264.228 Closure and Post Closure Care and liner requirements 264.221

[8] See fn. 1

[9] Section 1.6 “The NMED is responsible for review and approval of this report, and providing a process whereby members of the public may comment on the report and its conclusions. The NMED is also responsible for responding to public comments submitted during the specified public comment period.”

[10] The 2005 Final Order schedule was not followed by the NMED.  No report occurred in 2010 or 2015. Citizen Action brought an unsuccessful lawsuit seeking the report in 2015 but submission of the Report was delayed until January 2019. 

[11] Citizen Action made a public records request on 1/28/2019 to obtain the 5-Year Report.  The comment period for the 5-Year Report opened May 24, 2019 for 60 days. https://www.env.nm.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2017/05/MWL-5-Yr-Report-Public-Notice-2019-5-24-English.pdf

[12]No effort has been made for the MWL to comply with the Toxic Substances and Control Act (TSCA) regulations for the Polychlorinated Biphenyl (“PCB”) disposal or remediation. PCB was disposed of in a quantity of 251 cu yd. (50,827 gallons) in the MWL.  Corrective Measures Study, Appendix H, Table J- and J-2 (November 2002)  https://www.env.nm.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2019/10/App_H_Eval_of_Near-Term_Excavation.pdf. This amount of PCB could contaminate trillions of gallons of water alone.  No effort has been made to comply with the Toxic Substances and Control Act (TSCA) regulations for the PCB disposal or remediation.

[13]The 2005 Final Order requires the evaluation of the feasibility of excavation every five years. p. 5 para 5. “Sandia shall prepare a report every 5 years, re-evaluating the feasibility of excavation and analyzing the continued effectiveness of the selected remedy.”

[14]  2016 Final Order, p. 9. https://hwbdocuments.env.nm.gov/Sandia%20National%20Labs/2016-02-12%20Final%20Order%20-%20MWL.pdf

[15]Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) 42 U.S.C. § 6901et seq.  Re hazardous waste see: https://www.epa.gov/hw/defining-hazardous-waste-listed-characteristic-and-mixed-radiological-wastes#mixed

[16] See Appendix H – Alternate V-b Complete Excavation with Off-site Disposalhttps://www.env.nm.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2019/10/App_H_Eval_of_Near-Term_Excavation.pdf

[17] See ATTACHMENT B EMAILS

[18]Defective Groundwater Protection Practices at the Sandia National Laboratories’ Mixed Waste Landfill – The Sandia MWL Dump,  (Version January 22, 2011)  See Appendix A 1998 Notice of Deficiency and Appendix B  Moats and Winn Report. -  https://www.radfreenm.org/old_web/pages/GroundWater.htm

[19] Affidavit of Registered Geologist Robert Gilkeson in Support of Enforcing the 5-Year Review (2015) https://www.radfreenm.org/index.php/recent-updates/8-mixed-waste-landfill/78-sandia-haz-waste-hearing

[20] Ibid. fn18 and fn19

[21]The EPA OIG 2010 Hotline Report identified the lack of documentation for the Region 6 conclusion about the MWL groundwater monitoring wells and stated:

Specifically, Region 6 staff (1) took inappropriate steps to keep the details of the MWL monitoring wells assessment from the public, (2) decided not to provide documentation or sometimes not to document their concerns about the MWL monitoring wells, (3) provided a letter to CANM that did not note the specific details of the assessment, or (4) improperly placed a national security marking (Confidential) on the assessment. The Region’s actions are a violation of EPA’s Public Involvement Policy and EPA’s Records Management Policy.

[22] See Attachment C  email of EPA Richard Maher to NMED Will Moats Draft MWL groundwater monitoring wells per citizen request

[23] See Fn 18.

[24]The misrepresentation or omission of any relevant facts at any time can be grounds for the termination, modification, revocation or reissuance of a RCRA permit.) (40 CFR §§ 270.41-270.43, 270.43(2).

[25]The incorrect information has not been corrected. (40 CFR 270.30 (l)(11) and 20.4.1.900 NMAC -- Where the permittee becomes aware that it failed to submit any relevant facts in a permit application, or submitted incorrect information in a permit application or in any report to the Director, it shall promptly submit such facts or information. Also, 270.41-270.43, 270.43(2) -- The permittee’s failure in the application or during the permit issuance process to disclose fully all relevant facts, or the permittee’s misrepresentation of any relevant facts at any time).

 

[26]Defective Groundwater Protection Practices at the Sandia National Laboratories’ Mixed Waste Landfill – The Sandia MWL Dump, p.31-32 https://www.radfreenm.org/old_web/pages/GroundWater.htm

[27]Review of Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Evapotranspiration Cap Closure Plans for the Mixed Waste Landfill by Tom Hakonson, Ph.D. Biointrusion, fire, disease, and drought in combination with erosion can affect integrity of soil cover resulting in increased percolation of water into landfill.https://www.radfreenm.org/old_web/pages/hakonson_full.htm

[28]A year after fiery accident at radioactive waste dump in Nevada, the meter is running on a fix Las Vegas Review Journal (October 23, 2016) https://www.reviewjournal.com/local/local-nevada/a-year-after-fiery-accident-at-radioactive-waste-dump-in-nevada-the-meter-is-running-on-a-fix/A report by the NRC’s Mandeville after his team’s visit in November speculates that “numerous smaller earthquakes with a magnitude range between 2 and 5” might have caused new cracks or widened ones that were already there.

The U.S. Geological Survey’s website bolsters that theory, showing that 21 earthquakes of magnitude 2.0 or greater and centered within a 35-mile radius of the Beatty dump occurred between the inspection and the accident.  Water entered into explosive metallic sodium at Beatty.  Metallic sodium is also present in the MWL

[29] See 2006 TechLaw, Inc. Reporthttps://www.radfreenm.org/index.php/sandia-national-laboratories-mixed-waste-lanfill/mwl-technical/177-2006-techlaw-inc-report

[30]https://www.abqjournal.com/news/state/604899nm10-24-07.htmNMED Sues to Keep Report Closed

[31] See court dismissal of NMED lawsuit: https://www.radfreenm.org/old_web/pages/Legal/lg-2008oct08a.pdf

[32]Technical Testimony on the Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Mixed Waste Landfill (MWL) in Opposition to Corrective Action Complete (Direct Testimony July 8, 2015)By: Dr. Eric Nuttall, Ph.D., Emeritus, Chemical and Nuclear Engineering, Department of Chemical and Nuclear Engineering, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87106. Dr. Nuttall was a WERC panel member for the “Independent Peer Review of the MWL” (8/31/2001). https://www.newmexicopbs.org/productions/newmexicoinfocus/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/August-31-2001-WERC-Report-Inventory.pdf

 

[33]Covering Up 30 Years of Radioactive and Hazardous Waste: Mixed Waste Landfill, Dayton, p.3-7 (March 29,2004)http://www2.clarku.edu/mtafund/prodlib/newmexico/Covering_Up.pdfNMED Kennett Report failure to address the issues of spent fuel disposal in 2003.

Hits: 2599

Kirtland AFB Discovered Leaking Jet Fuel Earlier Than 1999

Kirtland AFB Discovered Leaking Jet Fuel Earlier Than 1999

Then Failed to Investigate and Remediate --

 

Report Prepared for Citizen Action New Mexico

by Dave McCoy, Esq., Executive Director

July 2013

 

SUMMARY

 

Kirtland Air Force Base spokespeople and Pentagon Air Force top brass have repeatedly misinformed the public and media about when problems at the Bulk Fuels Facility^[1] were first known. Documentation of waivers for pipeline testing, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, reveal that the AF knew much earlier than 1999[2] that jet fuel was leaking at the fuels facility, that the pipelines could not meet safety requirements and needed repairs/replacement.  

• In 1985 Kirtland knew fuel facility pipeline tests would fail if conducted. The AF issued a waiver for the 5 year pressure test because the pipelines did not meet AF requirements. Pipelines were not repaired and annually tested as ordered in the waiver. (See Attachment).
• The Air Force knew the fuel facility was leaking in 1992^[3] from a location identified as pump house Bldg 1033 and from contamination at a nearby evaporation pond; other pipelines were leaking elsewhere at Kirtland. (See pp. 3-5).
• In 1994 the AF issued waivers for both the 5 year pressure test and the annual pipeline testing because it was known that pipeline valves would fail. Replacement and repair of defective valves and piping was not done. The 1994 waivers described pipeline testing as “impossible.” (See p. 3 and Attachment).
• Kirtland’s claim that it did not know the aquifer was contaminated until 2007 is false. (p. 4)
• Kirtland knew from a feature on a 1951 aerial photograph that the historical fuel offloading/dispensing location showed soil contamination;^[4]
• Soil levels of diesel fuel were so high at the fuels facility offloading rack (ST-106) that the risk of an explosion existed from drilling monitoring wells. (See p. 5).   
• Kirtland has repeatedly not complied with New Mexico Environment Department orders to determine the magnitude of the leak, how far and how fast it is traveling. (Pp.3-4, 8, 9-10).
• Kirtland has no plan or actions to clean up the dissolved plume of contamination, but has embarked on a public propaganda campaign that “Albuquerque drinking water remains unaffected by the fuel plume and is expected to remain so indefinitely.”[5] That scenario can only be accomplished, however, if municipal wells are shut down or the drinking water is treated.  Treatment facilities do not currently exist at the Ridgecrest municipal well locations.
• Albuquerque’s municipal wells, Kirtland’s supply wells and the Veterans Administration Hospital supply well are all at risk from the spreading plume of contamination of Ethylene Dibromide, a potent carcinogen. Military personnel, sick veterans and residents receive water from these wells. (See p. 2, 4).
• Albuquerque’s plans for furnishing another 400,000 people with water are unrealistic and improbable given drought and contamination of 30 square miles of groundwater at other Albuquerque (See p. 11- Albuquerque – Where Dreams Die Thirsty in the Desert).
• The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 2013 report has inaccurate conclusions and recommendations based on inadequate data and errors. (See p. 12).

 

 

Kirtland failed to conduct an early and complete investigation into the leaking at the bulk fuels facility, missing an opportunity to remediate and halt the spread of a massive plume of aviation gas and jet fuel contamination that is now estimated at 24,000,000 gallons[6], the largest toxic spill into a public water supply in U.S. history. 

Mark Holmes, an Air Force project manager with Kirtland’s environmental unit stated in 2000, “I don’t think personally we’re going to find that much (that spilled).” ^[7]

 

Kirtland dragged its boots by not comprehensively investigating the integrity of the entire fuels facility for many decades and remained conveniently silent about early internal reports showing pipeline problems.  In its FOIA response, Kirtland could provide no evidence whatsoever of compliance with AF pipeline and inspection requirements in force prior to 1985. (See fn 11).  After the knowledge and waiver of pipeline defects in 1985 and leaking in 1992, more than a decade went by before Kirtland inspected the underground pipelines connecting the fuels facility pump house to the offloading rack.  This allowed the additional release and spreading of hundreds of thousands of gallons of jet fuel that could have been prevented. 

 

Had Kirtland extended its investigation from the facility’s leaking pump house to the fuels facility offloading rack[8] that were both connected by underground pipes, perhaps 20 years of the spreading off base plume of jet fuel and a 6000 ft long plume of dissolved Ethylene Dibromide (EDB) could have been prevented. Ethylene Dibromide is an exceptionally potent carcinogen with high solubility, mobility and persistence in groundwater.[9] EDB also has been found to be carcinogenic to fish (Hawkins et al. 1998). In addition to being carcinogenic, EDB causes neural tube damage in rat embryo culture (Brown-Woodman et al. 1998), and has been implicated in liver and kidney damage, and reproductive lesions such as reduced sperm levels (Scharder et al. 1988).[10]

 

Kirtland neglected for decades to make the five year pipeline integrity tests that federal law and Air Force regulations required.^[11]  Kirtland exhibited negligence per se in contaminating Albuquerque’s drinking water aquifer by ignoring and violating Air Force and federal regulations, New Mexico statutes^[12] and non-compliance with environmental clean up orders.^{[13] [14]} [15]

 

One of Kirtland’s excuses, recently concocted, for missing the largest jet fuel spill in history, is that the vacuum pipelines that sucked fuel to the pump house from the offloading rack were supposedly exempt from inspection.^[16]  Kirtland made certification under 40 CFR 270.11, which provides for criminal penalties, that the information was true, accurate and complete. The AFM 85-16 requirements for annual and 5 year inspections of pipelines applied to:

“All Air Force operated above and underground fuel piping systems at transfer operations, pumping and in-plant processing operations.” (Emphasis supplied).

 

Kirtland has provided no evidence -- in the references for the July 2011 work plan nor evidence of any written waivers in the Administrative Record or in the FOIA response -- to support or justify the failure from the 1950s until 1985 to inspect the pipelines as was required at the time by Air Force Manual 85-16.^[17] Five year hydrostatic pipeline pressure tests and annual pipeline inspections were required by Air Force Manual 85-16. 

A waiver for testing the fuels facility pipelines at Kirtland was issued based on known pipeline defects in 1985. (See attached waivers.) Evidence obtained under the Freedom of Information Act reveals that on October 22, 1985 Col. Wesley Nottingham, AF Director of Maintenance and Operations issued a waiver for the 5 year hydrostatic testing of the fuel lines (at 1½ times operating pressure).   The waiver ordered the continuance of annual pipeline testing with repair/replacement on a priority basis.  “Leaking lines are to be removed from service until repaired.”  Since it is admitted by KAFB that the lines were leaking for decades, it is evident that at least the annual inspections and repairs were not performed as required in the waivers. 

 

In June 1994 two separate waivers were granted – one for the 5-year hydrostatic test and one for the annual test requirements because the piping and valves could not be tested (see attached): 

“The reason for this request is the 1950 vintage plug valves that are presently used in this fuel system, will not positively shut off and isolate the fuel and pressure. Thereby testing is impossible.  At this time an MCP project to replace piping and valves is pending that will rectify this problem.  But until completed this situation to isolate piping due to a[n] emergency fuel spill or to perform required maintenance will exist.”

 

The requirement that “Lines with known leaks or repair requirements should be repaired prior to testing,” was contained in the 1985 and 1994 waivers.  No repairs were made.  Kirtland did not perform a hydrostatic pipeline test (at 150% of operating pressure) at the fuel facility offloading rack until 1999.  Although the fuel facility was installed in the 1950s, Kirtland claims it did not test the integrity of the pipelines for decades even though federal law required testing every five years.^[18] When Kirtland tested the fuel supply lines in 1999, pressure was lost in seconds and some 200-400 gallons of jet fuel spilled into the ground from the two, 48 year old, corroded pipelines #22 and #23. The so-called “small spill” was from Kirtland’s own testing and did not encompass the volumes already released before testing.

 

The three types of fuel handled by pipelines at the BFF were aviation gas (AvGas; high-octane gasoline), Jet Propellant-4 fuel (JP-4), and JP-8. The use of AvGas and JP-4 at Kirtland AFB was phased out in 1975 and 1993, respectively.^[19]  The presence of all three fuels in the soil shows that the leaking occurred for decades without investigation.

 

Soil samples taken in 1992 around pump house Bldg #1033, which was part of the bulk fuels facility, showed “the presence of elevated concentrations of petroleum hydrocarbons and associated compounds” that exceeded environmental limits up to 3600 times.^[20]  The pump house was about 275 ft distant from the offloading fuel rack and the areas were connected by fuel pipelines for the supply of fuel.^[21] 

 

In the early 1990s Kirtland was pumping between 20-25 million gallons of fuel per year. The soil area was visibly contaminated around pump house building #1033.  In 1993 the area of the pump house was identified as a solid waste management unit (SWMU ST-341) that required investigation.^[22] This information should reasonably have caused Kirtland to fully investigate its entire fuel facility. Federal and state law required Kirtland to determine the rate, direction and the distance that such spills travel.^[23] Until 1999, Kirtland took no steps to sample the nearby soil at the bulk fuels offloading rack area or the pipelines that delivered the fuel to the nearby pump house.

 

Kirtland was aware from visual observation and samples taken in 1992 and more than 100 soil samples taken during 1994 through 1996 that leaking was occurring in the vicinity of the pump house from a condensate holding tank and an evaporation pond.^[24] Seven years supposedly passed before Kirtland investigated or reported whether leaking was occurring around the fuel offloading racks to where the pipelines extended from the pump building.^[25] 

 

Boreholes were only drilled 12 ft deep near Building #1033.^[26]  There were “data gaps” for knowledge about the horizontal and vertical extent of the contamination.^[27] The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) identified high levels of gasoline and diesel contamination in 1998 and stated that Kirtland needed to specify the depth to groundwater and provide more environmental information about the ST-341 pump house site.^[28]  

 

Kirtland’s claim that it did not know the aquifer was contaminated until 2007[29] is false.  In 2006 Kirtland learned from skimmer pumps that the jet fuel plume was off base at Bullhead Park.  However, the contamination of groundwater from jet fuel, including Ethylene Dibromide, was known as a threat to “receptors,” i.e., the municipal wells, five years earlier, as shown by an internal Kirtland April 1, 2002 memorandum:[30]

“Contamination exceeding WQCC standards was detected in the subsurface soil to

a depth of 300 fbgs with an areal extent of 6-7 acres. Contamination has been detected in the groundwater beneath the site at a depth of 480 fbgs, 180 feet below the vertical extent of the contamination, which also exceeds WQCC standards. The groundwater contamination was caused by downward diffusion & the soil gas to the water table.

… “The extent of the contamination is significant and continued corrective action is required. The Relative Risk Evaluation is High based on groundwater contamination and identified receptors.”  (Emphasis supplied).

 

The Veteran’s Administration Hospital supply well is nearest to the EDB plume. It lies approximately 1200 feet north of the fuels facility offloading rack and a little more than 500 ft west of the EDB plume.  In 2006 monitoring well KAFB-1064 was constructed in the VA parking lot, 200 ft away, to serve as a “sentinel” monitoring well upgradient of the VA Hospital’s production well. TPH-DRO, TPH-GRO, toluene, naphthalene, phenanthrene, nitrate, dissolved iron, and dissolved manganese were detected from the very first groundwater sample.[31] 

 

KAFB currently has shut down supply wells KAFB-15 and KAFB-16 and is not sampling them for contamination, reportedly for excessive NO_x emissions and pump failure, respectively.[32] A bent valve was found in a cylinder of the #16 pump and the cost to repair the problem is around $30,000. “Mr. Wilson had stated during his ride around inspection that he didn’t want to spend any more money on Well 16 since it is also the highest arsenic level Well KAFB operates.”  

 

The Air Force knew in the 1980s that spills and leaks were commonplace at Kirtland and other bases and highly toxic to drinking water.  Kirtland began review of waste generation sources, including the Fuels Management areas in November 1981. Underground tanks were pressure tested quarterly to find unseen leaks.[33]  Hundreds of contaminated sites were identified by the EPA at Kirtland in the 1980s and 1990s. For example, an Underground Tank Storage (UST) pipeline for intermittent vehicle refueling at a different Kirtland site had tightness tests performed in September and October 1991; results indicated that the product line from UST 58 was in a state of failure.[34] News articles in 1987 raised the issue that UST petroleum storage was a contributor to contamination at Mountain View. EPA called for sampling and hydrology evaluations to address the Mountain View problem.[35] Chemicals still remain today in the soil and aquifer at Kirtland dumps, burn pits, explosive sites, labs, radioactive training sites, septic lines, underground tanks, radioactive animal carcass pits.^[36] The Agency for Toxic Substances Disease Registry identified the problem existing at Air Force bases.^[37]

 

Kirtland also abandoned a buried 8-inch fuel line (ST-108) that supplied Aviation Gas and JP-4 to the refueling area from the pump house. The ST-108 fuel line was originally part of the Kirtland AFB Bulk Fuels Facility installed in approximately 1953.  That pipeline was part of the bulk fuels facility, 4500 ft long, and was more than 40 years old. A total of 915 gallons of fuel was later pigged and drained from the buried pipeline. It was discovered according to this document “During site preparation for the construction of a new fire station at Kirtland.”[38] The date of the fire station construction is not given. Use of the buried line was discontinued sometime in the 1980s.

 

Another version of the ST-108 pipeline: “The distribution station and a section of the southern portion of the fuel line were removed by the City of Albuquerque (COA) during taxiway construction for the Albuquerque International Sunport in 1993.” “The period of operation of the fuel line is not known, and no records exist that document either the partial removal by the COA or any tightness testing of the line.”[39] 

 

The observable stained surface soil at the ST-106 offloading rack in 1999 was from an area approximately 25 ft by 75 ft.  The ground was “saturated” with fuel so the staining did not just occur overnight and would have been observable well prior to 1999. Approximately 76 cubic yards of soil was excavated and disposed offsite in November 1999 after “discovery” of the release.^[40]

 

Kirtland found that the soil levels of diesel fuel were so high at the bulk fuels facility (ST-106) that the risk of an explosion existed from drilling. 

“Concentrations of contaminants in the vadose zone reached 100% of the lower

explosive limit during drilling activities. This required changes to drilling

techniques to minimize explosion risks. Also detected were vinyl chloride in soil gas, necessitating additional health and safety precautions.”^[41]

 

For Kirtland authorities not to have known of the spill prior to 1999 requires that fuel facility personnel were blind, had no sense of smell, or were completely indifferent to a large area of soil that was visibly stained and saturated from decades of leaking jet fuel, and; that they utterly failed to perform their regulatory duties for inspection, keeping inventory, clean up, spill prevention and response, annual reports, sampling, testing, ongoing communication with other personnel, workplace safety evaluations, emergency planning, and safety exercises. 

 

Under AF guidelines, the Key Compliance Personnel who had numerous duties to perform to keep a fuel facility safe included^[42]:

• Base Environmental Protection Committee (EPC). The EPC is usually responsible for drafting and reviewing the spill prevention and response (SPR) plan prior to its promulgation by the Base Commander and for the annual review and update of the SPR plan. Often, the EPC delegates the specific preparation of the plan to the Base Civil Engineering (BCE) for implementation by the Base Environmental Coordinator (EC). The EPC also is responsible for review and implementation of the Base Plan for recoverable and waste petroleum.
• Spill Response Team (SRT). The SRT is tasked to respond to spills when requested by an On-Scene Commander (OSC) and to perform spill containment, recovery, cleanup, disposal and restoration activities as directed by the OSC. The SRT is a multidisciplinary team often including the following persons: BCE, Base Environmental Coordinator, Bioenvironmental Engineer (BEE), Base Disaster Preparedness Officer (BDPO), Fire Chief, Security Police Chief, Public Affairs Officer (PAO), Base Fuels Flight Commander, Safety Chief, and Staff Judge Advocate (JA).
• Base Fire Department. The fire department provides support in emergency response, spill events, exercises, and fire protection activities. In addition, the department will be responsible for making periodic fire safety inspections of flammable or combustible storage and handling areas, hazardous waste storage areas, and accumulation points on the installation.
• Safety Manager. This individual is responsible for conducting workplace safety evaluations and inspections of the handling and storage of hazardous materials and waste. They will provide the appropriate manager with a report of their findings and recommended corrective actions. They are also responsible for ensuring the prompt and accurate investigation of any hazardous material mishaps that result in injury or property damage.
• Base Fuels Management Officer (BFMO). The BFMO is responsible for the safe and efficient receipt, storage, handling, issuing, and accounting of all petroleum products to include all general operations and inspections.
• The Base Civil Engineer (BCE). The BCE is responsible for the maintenance of all installed petroleum storage and dispensing systems. This responsibility often is discharged by the Liquid Fuels Maintenance (LFM) shop. The BCE also is responsible for the calibration of permanently installed meters.
• Base Environmental Coordinator (EC). The EC monitors all POL activities that may affect the environment and usually is responsible for the coordination of the EPC review and updates of the SPR plan. The EC also often coordinates the reportable spills notification of appropriate Federal and state agencies on behalf of the Base OSC. Generally the EC comes under the BCE.
• The Bioenvironmental Engineer (BEE). The BEE takes samples to determine the chemical nature, pollutant concentration, and extent of each reportable quantity spill as required for response actions and documentation.
• The Base Disaster Preparedness Officer (BDPO). The BDPO is responsible for emergency planning and training of installation disaster response forces. When appointed as Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) coordinator, the BPDO will exchange emergency response plans with the LEPC and participate in LEPC meetings.

 

Could these above personnel all have failed to perform their duties, not provided written reports or observed what amounted to decades of leaking aviation gas and jet fuel?  An environmental assessment team reviewer with written questions and a checklist was tasked with: reviewing records for spills; interviewing the above fuel facility personnel for compliance with applicable standards, and; inspection of the fuels facility to see that there was compliance with environmental regulations that included:

“Verify that a file of Federal and state POL, Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasures (SPCC) plan (Spill Prevention), and Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency (OHSPC) plan Regulations are maintained and kept current at the installation:

- Executive Order (EO) 12088, Federal Compliance With Pollution Standards. (1978)

- 33 CFR 153, Control of Pollution by Oil and Hazardous Substances, Discharge Removal.

- 40 CFR 110, Discharge of Oil.

- 40 CFR 112. Oil Pollution Prevention.

- 40 CFR 279, Standards for the Management of Used Oil.

- 40 CFR 300, National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency

Plan.

- Air Force Instruction (AFI) 23-201, Fuels Management.

- AFI 23-502, Recoverable and Unusable Liquid Petroleum Products.

- AFI 32-7044, Storage Tank Management.

- AFM 85-16, Maintenance of Petroleum Systems.

- Technical Order TO 35-1-3, 36-1-3, 37-1-1, 42B-1-1, 42B-1-23, and 00-25-172.

- applicable state and local regulations.

Verify that the Base Staff Judge Advocate reviews Federal, state, and local regulations that may affect ongoing and proposed activities and keeps the EPC informed as needed.

Verify that the installation has an appointed Fuels Environmental Coordinator.”

   

In November 1999 Kirtland informed NMED that fuel facility personnel “recently contacted” Kirtland Environmental Management about the line spill.^[43]  No date for when personnel first contacted EM was given.  What were fuel facility personnel doing in relation to the fuels facility for the decades before 1999?  Could it have been reported earlier? Was it reported earlier but just deliberately ignored? The offloading rack was in regular use and the area would have been observed on a recurring basis. The Kirtland memorandum informed NMED:

“Environmental Management was recently contacted by personnel of the KAFB Fuels Management Facility after they observed stained soils at the facilities' offloading rack. EM staff went to the site and instructed site staff to dig down to determine if the staining indicated more than just a surface spill event. The ground was found to be saturated with fuel.” (Emphasis supplied).

 

Kirtland surmised there could have been an earlier history of the lines leaking. “The primary below ground transfer pipeline (pipeline #22) had been in a state of failure for an unknown duration and therefore the total amount of fuel released is unknown.”^[44]  Upon testing Pipeline #23 the second time, “product visibly bubbled from the ground.”^[45] Both of the 48-year old pipelines “failed from corrosion” within seconds of the pressure testing. 

 

Just how Kirtland accounted for fuel inventory and loss is unexplained and conflicting.  The Air Force required fuel management accounting, including metering, for decades before Kirtland’s unexplained lack of records: “To prevent fraud, theft, and misappropriation, the organization commander manages, controls, and accounts for all fuel issued to and received in their organizational tanks.” The quantity for each tank was to be determined and a record of it kept on file for auditing purposes.[46]

 

Kirtland inventory records for the one year prior to the “spill” showed JP-8 fuel loss of 97,171 gallons for pipeline #22. However, in a November 2000 addendum to its Abatement Plan, Kirtland claimed that inventory records were only kept from 1996 forward and showed a loss of 157,353 gallons of JP-8 for a 5-year period but with no records for JP-4 fuel.^{[47] [48]}  The earlier investigation of the pump house and evaporation pond (ST-341) were later described as being “pertinent” to investigation of the pipeline leak (ST-106). 

 

NMED’s Ground Water Quality Bureau (GWQB) informed Kirtland in July 2000 that its  Abatement Plan for sampling only along pipelines #22 and #23 would not be adequate to

determine the full horizontal and vertical extent of the contamination.^[49]

 

In 2000 Kirtland claimed it would only need to spend $400,000 investigating the missing 157,000 gallons.^[50]  Ten years later on May 22, 2010, former NMED Secretary Curry announced that the cost of cleaning up the fuel leak could top $100 million. But that cost estimate was made when it was believed the leak was 8 million gallons, not the triple-sized 24 million gallon gusher estimated in 2012.^[51] The magnitude of the spill and the spread of the plume of EDB might have been significantly reduced had the pipelines been tested on the five year schedule.^[52] 

 

After decades of purportedly failing to inspect the bulk fuels facility‘s components, in 2012 Kirtland could confirm with conviction its ignorance about the source(s) and timing for the jet fuel and aviation gasoline spills:

“The exact history of releases is unknown. Conceptually, releases could have occurred when fuel was transferred from railcars, through the fuel offloading rack (FFOR), to the Pump House, and then to the bulk fuel storage containers on the south end of the site (aboveground storage tanks [ASTs] 2420 and 2422).”^[53]

 

In 2002 NMED again criticized the investigation of the pump house contamination (ST-341) as being inadequate for the plan to locate the bottom of the plume of contamination.^[54]

 

Perhaps the concept of “plume boundaries” related to differing source areas of contamination at Kirtland and Sandia Labs needs re-examining.  Should the concept instead be more along the lines of “contamination without borders?”  A total of more than 560 sites of contamination were identified at Sandia Labs and Kirtland in the presence of a very large and mobile aquifer. 

 

Despite Sandia Labs and Kirtland’s possession of some of the most powerful computers in the world, no real time three-dimensional model for the aquifer and contamination movement exists at present.  Groundwater analysis by boreholes and monitoring wells has not been adequate to convey a full picture of the complex relation between past and present contamination and potential transport between all the various sites where releases occurred at Kirtland and Sandia Labs.^[55]  

 

In 2004 CH2M Hill estimated that the prospects for bioremediation of the jet fuel were “not significant:”^[56]

“Because of the depth of the contamination, the lack of oxygen, and the lack of moisture in much of the Kirtland AFB subsurface soils, the reduction in contaminant concentrations by biodegradation would not be expected to be significant (USAF, 200l b).”

 

Despite insignificant prospects for bioremediation, in March 2011, the Air Force Report to Congressional Committees was that: “Using natural processes without further active treatment, modeling indicates that the dissolved constituents would meet drinking water standards by 2025.”^[57] Of course that modeling estimate was made before NMED announced that the spill is three times as large as it was thought to be in 2011. NMED later informed Kirtland that EDB does not naturally biodegrade.^[58]  Estimates for the arrival time of EDB at the municipal wells is between less than 5 to 10 years.  Maps for the extent of the EDB plume are only drawn to show where the EPA drinking water limit is (50 parts per trillion), not where the laboratory limit of detection is (10 ppt).  This makes the EDB plume map appear smaller than it really is. 

 

Beginning in 2004, Kirtland claimed that soil vapor evaporation (SVE) technology would clean up any remaining contamination at the bulk fuels facility within 3 years with no further action necessary.^[59] Between 2004 and 2009, Kirtland only installed four SVE units, an insufficient number of units for the area of contamination. As explained above, Kirtland knew in 2002 that the jet fuel was already in the aquifer. Kirtland misinformed the public that SVE technology would solve the problem, despite EPA statements in 1994 that SVE could only treat unsaturated zones and was not effective treatment for diesel fuels and ethylene dibromide that do not readily volatilize.^[60] 

 

In 2009, the NMED Ground Water Quality Bureau (GWQB) demanded that Kirtland take remediation activities at the “soonest practicable juncture.” The GWQB rejected Kirtland’s plan for a three-year delay after investigation to commence the full-scale abatement of off-base remediation of dissolved ground water contamination.^[61] NMED also disapproved of the phased approach to implementing an interim measure to contain the fuel plume and directed the Air Force to install 16 SVE wells with internal-combustion engine (ICE) vacuum units to contain the fuel plume.^[62] Kirtland refused to operate more than the original 4 SVE units that were at times placed inefficiently or shut down for months and with deferred maintenance. The four units were indefinitely shutdown in December 2012. 

 

On April 2, 2010, the GWQB transferred the jet fuel spill to the Hazardous Waste Bureau (HWB) harshly admonishing Kirtland that:

“KAFB has not complied with the requirements of the GWQB's first and second Notices of Deficiencies (NODs). KAFB has failed to provide an interim work plan with specific dates for task completion, or a revised timeline that provides for the investigation and abatement of off-base plumes in a reasonable time frame. Additionally, KAFB's December 30, 2009 letter indicates that it will not be moving expeditiously to begin active remediation of off-base contamination. Given the scope and severity of the contamination plume, KAFB's proposed approach is not acceptable.”^[63]

 

The orders of the HWB have been largely ignored as well.  The Air Force ignored four NMED orders beginning in April 2, 2010 to produce an Interim Measures (IM) Work Plan that would bring about full remediation of the LNAPL plume within 5 years.^[64] No IM plan providing remediation other than the use of SVE has been submitted by the Air Force. A plan for a containment well was only partially approved by NMED because it could make the plume travel further toward the northeast where municipal wells are located:

“NMED staff said that the light non aqueous phase liquid (LNAPL) containment well that was drilled to stop the forward movement of the fuel product floating on the water table have been delayed due to some concerns raised at the NMED that the wells may act to pull the LNAPL plume further downgradient, rather than halt its movement. NMED staff told the board that the three concerns they have for the status of this site is the data gap that exists for the extent of the dissolved phase plume, the existence of ethylene dibromide (EDB) above the drinking water standards at all depths, and the evidence of a “diving” EDB at the farthest reach of the dissolved phase plume.^[65]

 

The first off base monitoring wells were not drilled until 2010, eighteen years after leaking was discovered at the fuels facility.  Three new clusters of monitoring wells installed northeast of the EDB plume in 2012, have not detected contamination.  Some see that as a hopeful sign and count on many more years before the EDB plume may reach municipal wells.^[66]  However, the plume is still moving at an unknown velocity.  Monitoring Well KAFB-10615 detected ethylene dibromide (EDB) in 3^rd Quarter 2012 sampling at a concentration of 0.075 micrograms per liter (μg/L); that is 1½ times the EPA drinking water limit.^[67] That monitoring location, which lies southeast of Gibson and Louisiana, signals a possible widening of the EDB plume to the east by nearly 1000 ft.  A lithographic depiction of monitoring wells from the 4^th Q Report shows the presence of EDB at the outer toe of the plume at a 100 ft depth that is attributed to the “pull” of the Ridgecrest municipal wells.  The flow velocity of the plume will continue to accelerate as it draws nearer to the municipal wells. The flow velocity still has not been calculated, according to NMED.[68]

 

Shaw Environmental is informing regulators and the public in 2013 that the LNAPL plume is “stable.” NMED isn’t buying the stability story and points to the conflicting language in Kirtland’s own technical reports saying that “stability” doesn‘t mean the plume isn‘t still moving.  NMED further challenges Kirtland’s claims about bioremediation of the plume and states ^[69]:

“The fact that EDB is not naturally attenuating or biodegrading indicates that this particular compound is not part of a stable plume.” 

 

Shaw reported that the jet fuel became trapped beneath a rising water table due to conservation efforts. The trapped jet fuel will be “an ongoing source of dissolved groundwater contamination indefinitely.”^[70]

 

The Albuquerque Bernalillo County Water Utility passed resolutions in 2012 seeking to accelerate the timetable to December 2013 for producing a plan for remediation.^[71]

 

Now, 20 years after discovering contamination at the fuel facility, Kirtland still has not determined the flow velocity nor the full lateral and vertical extent of the dissolved plume of ethylene dibromide that has traveled more than 6000 feet from the fuel facility toward  Albuquerque‘s municipal wells.^[72]  Nor has Kirtland offered any comprehensive work plan to remediate or halt the spreading plume of cancer-causing ethylene dibromide headed for Albuquerque‘s municipal drinking water wells.^{[73] [74]}

 

Kirtland’s continuing mantra that it “owns the problem” provides no real relief, especially since the Air Force only sees a duty to keep the level of contamination in the drinking water below the maximum limits imposed by the EPA.  Because EDB is classified as a probable human carcinogen, as a matter of public policy, EPA sets the recommended level at zero. The allowable limit in New Mexico is 50 parts per trillion but only 10 ppt in California and Massachusetts.  Why should residents feel secure if the water only contains 49 parts per million of EDB at the tap?

 

The challenge that the best remediation companies seem to have with the Kirtland site is addressing the contractual relationship with the Air Force.  These companies are unwilling to engage in a pay for performance contract with the Air Force. The contracting terms are too uncertain and the cost to apply for one of these contracts is unreasonable. Hence the public gets second rate companies, as Shaw Environmental, now acquired by CB&I,[75] has proven to be. 

 

Albuquerque -- Where Dreams Die Thirsty in the Desert

 

Albuquerque Water Supplies-- Pipe Dream or Wet Dream?

 

The Water Utility Authority claims that there is sustainable water supply until 2050 for another 400,000 more people in Albuquerque (ABQ), giving ABQ a population of over 1 million.^[76] Where will the water come from?^[77]  The City of Albuquerque currently delivers roughly 35 billion gallons of water annually. Another 400,000 people will require an additional 12 billion gallons more than Albuquerque currently produces.  The shortfall of water that ABQ can get from its allotment from the San Juan Chama diversion on the Rio Grande is approximately 3.3 billion gallons annually.  But can that difference be made up from increased ground water pumping? 

 

It can quickly be realized that Albuquerque may exceed the limits to growth that will be imposed by the Rio Grande and groundwater shortages from severe drought, loss of watershed due to fires and a poisoned aquifer. Given the drought, the major source of drinking water is the groundwater.  It is not being protected from contamination.  As NMED puts it:^[78]

“The [Kirtland Air Force Base] Bulk Fuels Facility Spill is the most significant groundwater contamination site in New Mexico because of contaminant types and concentrations, and the plume’s proximity to water supply wells serving the most populated community in the state.”

 

The Ridgecrest municipal wells that are the largest providers of groundwater for ABQ are threatened with a plume of Ethylene Dibromide (EDB) coming from the 24,000,000 gallon jet fuel and aviation gas release at Kirtland AFB. The EDB alone has the potential to contaminate trillions of gallons of groundwater.  Increased groundwater pumping can accelerate the movement of contamination from Kirtland AFB toward municipal wells.  

 

Three Superfund sites already exist in Albuquerque-- the South Valley Superfund Site, the AT&SF, and the Fruit Avenue Plume.^[79]  Many other contaminated sites exist in Albuquerque.[80]

 

The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Control Registry (ATSDR) provided the following public health assessment regarding unhealthful groundwater resources and that did not include the Kirtland jet fuel gusher:[81]

“In Albuquerque and Bernalillo County, over 150 documented ground-water contamination events have contaminated vast amounts of ground water, its quality degraded to an extent that affects its usefulness as drinking water. More than 20 of these cases may reach Environmental Protection Agency Superfund National Priorities List. The New Mexico Environmental Improvement Department (NMEID) estimates that, so far, this pollution has affected about 20 public supply wells and 450 private wells in Bernalillo County. As much as 30 square miles of land area may overlie contaminated ground-water supplies. Septic-tank systems, underground storage tanks, landfills, industrial facilities, and releases of hazardous materials from other sources caused this pollution.”

 

A July 12, 2013 ATSDR Evaluation of Potential Exposures: Bulk Fuels Facility Groundwater Plume[82] for Albuquerque concludes:

 

“There are no past, present, or expected future exposures via the groundwater (down-gradient water supply wells) pathway. BFF-related contaminants have not been detected in the water supply wells. Although it is expected that BFF contaminants would eventually migrate downgradient to water supply wells in the absence of remedial or contingency actions, such actions are already occurring and will be upgraded in the near future (Shaw, 2012c).”

 

The ATSDR conclusions that alternate supplies of water will be found and that effective remediation of EDB contamination will occur are speculative at best and based on errors.  There is no plan or ongoing remediation of the dissolved plume of LNAPL and EDB. The bulk of the LNAPL is trapped beneath the water table and cannot be removed with SVE technology.  Thinking that 24,000,000 gallons of jet fuel in the aquifer is not a crisis is not justifiable given the unknowns and the AF track record of contaminating other communities’ drinking water. The efficacy of removal technology is in serious doubt as there is currently no utilization of any technology by Shaw that will contain the plume trapped beneath the groundwater table and that has moved off base. The report does not mention that KAFB supply wells #15 and #16 are now shut down and are no longer being monitored for EDB contamination.  SVE is not effective for groundwater removal of EDB which is not readily volatile.  SVE equipment was shut down in December 2012.  Also, the edge of the plume is unknown, the velocity is unknown, the amount of contamination in the vadose zone is unknown, and the monitoring wells that were supposed to be placed near the municipal wells are not in place as per WUA resolutions. The new USGS well is 2000 ft away. The existence of an "alternate" source of water is not identified at present and there are about 30 square miles of contaminated groundwater in ABQ not counting KAFB and Sandia. 

The ATSDR remedy for protection, shutdown of the Ridgecrest municpal wells, ignores the 45+ wells to the north of Ridgecrest that will still create a cone of depression for further travel of EDB to additional wells. 

 

EPA, out of political deference to the Governor, Air Force and developers, has not placed the jet fuel spill on the National Priorities List[83] or imposed emergency cleanup action although the jet fuel contamination clearly meets all the necessary requirements as the largest underground toxic spill threatening a municipal water supply. 

 

Nitrate and TCE contamination are in numerous other locations at Kirtland and Sandia National Laboratories. Kirtland’s unlined dumps often contain dozens of organic solvents that lie above Albuquerque’s aquifer.[84] Some dumps contained for example, radioactive isotopes such as Cesium-137, Plutonium-239 along with irradiated animal carcasses placed in plastic bags in dirt trenches.[85] Decisions for leaving wastes in place have been made on computer modeling results instead of requiring accurate water quality data from a reliable network of monitoring wells.[86]

 

The Water Utility Authority and NMED refuse to request Sandia Labs to clean up the Mixed Waste Landfill with 1,500,000 cu ft of radioactive and hazardous waste leaking into the aquifer. No clean up is underway for the Tijeras Arroyo area with contaminated groundwater from TCE and nitrates.  A large nitrate plume is present in much of the same area where the EDB plume is located.

 

The Office of the State Engineer/Interstate Stream Commission (OSE/ISC) informed the NM State Legislature in a report for a funding request to update the lower Rio Grande regional water plan that:[87]

“OSE/ISC concludes as more time passes, and water problems increase in magnitude statewide, existing regional water plans are outdated and useless in addressing emerging water crises.”(Emphasis supplied).

 

The rosy Water Utility Authority estimate for servicing increased population growth does not take into consideration such factors as: reductions in SJC water, unsettled Navajo river claims, reduction in river water from groundwater mining, extensive contamination of the groundwater aquifer, changing climate, drought and loss of watershed from fire, shortages for agriculture, endangered species requirements (silvery minnow), accelerated runoff from urban growth and arsenic levels that must be diluted.[88]  The estimate does not identify the future growth already on the planning books that has not been supplied, nor does it show the levels of growth that may be applied for in the future.[89] 

 In 2013 water diverted from the Rio Grande is being halted for four months due to drought conditions.[90] Eleven thousand farmers will not receive Rio Grande water.  That means mining more groundwater sources and that means even less groundwater entering the Rio Grande. 

 

Example, the Mesa del Sol residential development will have 35,000 homes with another 100,000 residents that need water.  Residential usage (average 150 gallons per day per capita) X (100,000 planned residents) X (365 days) will require an additional delivery of 5,475,000,000 gallons per year (16,800 afy) just for Mesa del Sol. Add to Mesa del Sol’s water consumption the numerous other large scale real estate developments planned for Albuquerque for more hundreds of thousands people.^[91] Forest City is bailing out of its investment in Mesa del Sol.[92]  

 

Kirtland has an infrastructure to supply 2 billion gallons of water annually.  If KAFB supply wells become contaminated or shut down, Kirtland will seek water from the city. Sandia Labs uses over 555,000,000 gallons annually supplied by Kirtland’s infrastructure. 

 

Albuquerque’s fantasy of unlimited growth may soon have a sharp collision with reality and the existing businesses, homeowners, residents and fish that are demanding the supply of plentiful and clean water.  Watch for spiraling water rates from water scarcity induced by overdevelopment and poor political land use planning.  Contaminated drinking water from Kirtland could result in a crush of homeowners seeking to sell real estate at rock bottom prices.

 

 

Dave McCoy, Esq. Executive Director

Citizen Action New Mexico

This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

505 262-1862

 

ATTACHMENTS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

REFERENCES

 

^[1] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/33/3382.PDF , p.1-1 Comprehensive Site Evaluation of Bulk Fuels Area, September 2004. “The ‘Bulk Fuels Facility’ refers to a group of buildings, piping and associated appurtenances used to store and transfer jet fuel from tankers and rail cars to the flight line at Kirtland AFB. The JP-4, JP-8, and AVGAS were pumped from the tanker trucks through the offloading rack (Building 2405) to a pump house (Building 1033) under suction via two 14-inch-diameter underground transfer lines. The fuel was then pumped under pressure to the aboveground storage tanks through underground and above ground piping of varying diameters.”

[2] http://www.kirtland.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-080731-037.pdf, p.1. Kirtland AFB Fuel Leak Public Meeting July 31, 2008

^[3]  https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/00/35.PDF , FINAL NON-WASTE LINE INVESTIGATION WORK PLAN, May 1994, p. 16-1:“During a previous base environmental compliance and monitoring program inspection, a spill was observed near the UST standpipe. In December 1992, Kirtland AFB Compliance and Assessment personnel collected a soil sample near the suspected spill area. The sample was analyzed according to EPA Methods 8020 and 418.1 and contained petroleum hydrocarbons, ethylbenzene, toluene, and xylenes. The site was revisited on March 3, 1993 by Kirtland AFB personnel. Shallow soil samples (6 to 7 inches below grade) were collected at four locations in the spill area. Hydrocarbon odors were noted at all sample locations and Kirtland AFB personnel reported a small area of surface soil contamination around the base of the UST Stand pipe and extending a few feet west. Based on this information and previous analytical results, the Condensate Holding Tank was added as a SWMU to the RCRA Part B Permit.”

^[4] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/31%5C3159.PDF , 3/9/2007 NMED letter to Carl J. Lanz, P.G., p. 2, Item 3. “A plan to assess soil contamination near the historical fuel offloading/dispensing feature identified in the 1951 aerial photograph nearest the KAFB-1065 well …”

[5] http://www.kirtland.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-130212-025.pdf Bulk Fuels Facility Project Update February 8, 2013

[6] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/20/kirtland-air-force-base-fuel-spill_n_1688603.html Kirtland Air Force Base Jet Fuel Spill Threatens Albuquerque Water Supply 07/20/2012

^[7]  See ABQ Journal, John Fleck, http://www.abqjournal.com/main/2012/06/21/blogs/nm-science/the-very-first-kirtland-fuel-spill-story.html

[8] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/CABMeetings/Documents/CAB%20Meeting.test.pdf See p. 11, photo of offloading rack.

[9] Ethylene Dibromide and 1,2-Dichloroethane Contamination from Leaded Gasoline Releases, Ronald W. Falta, p.1 http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:LbZzwu1R6DIJ:info.ngwa.org/gwol/pdf/041980217.pdf+Ethylene+Dibromide+and+1,2-Dichloroethane+Contamination+from+Leaded+Gasoline+Releases,+Ronald+W.+Falta&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

[10] http://water.usgs.gov/wrri/00grants/NMaquifers.pdf  Genetic Techniques for the Verification and Monitoring of Dihaloethane Biodegradation in New Mexico Aquifers, Dr. Rebecca Reiss (2001).

 Fresh water supplies throughout the world are threatened by the release of the dihaloethanes 1,2-dibromoethane (EDB) and 1,2-dichloroethane (EDC).  In New Mexico, approximately 175 locations have or have had EDB or EDC contaminated soil and groundwater, our primary drinking water source.

^[11] AFMAN 85-16, Maintenance of Petroleum System, 15 March 1956, 18 August 1981. Superseded by AFMAN 32-1275 http://www.wbdg.org/ccb/DOD/UFC/ufc_3_460_03.pdf, UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC) OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE: MAINTENANCE OF PETROLEUM SYSTEMS Section 2.3 Maintenance of On Base Pipelines. “2.3.3.2. Five-Year Hydrostatic Test. Perform a hydrostatic pressure test every five years on all

underground fuel transfer pipelines (product is typically the test media for this test).”

See AFM 85-16 requirements at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA297390 The Environmental Compliance Assessment and Management (ECAMP) Supplement for The Environmental Assessment Program and Management (TEAM) Guide, p. 8-15 “Air Force operated offsite pipelines should be inspected at least once per week by air patrol, and once a year by line walker or vehicle patrol. All Air Force operated above and underground fuel piping systems at transfer operations, pumping and in-plant processing operations should be managed according to specific parameters. All underground aviation fuel transfer pipelines should be subject to a hydrostatic pressure test on a 5-yr reoccurring basis.” (Emphasis supplied).

^[12] http://wrri.nmsu.edu/publish/watcon/proc32/Goad.pdf Historical Overview of New Mexico Ground Water Protection Programs, Maxine Goad, p. 36-37 -- Burden of proof is upon discharger to demonstrate discharge would not pollute the groundwater. See, http://lawlibrary.unm.edu/nrj/19/3/12_whitham_newmexico.pdf Bokum Resources Corp., et. al. v. New Mexico Water Quality Control Commission, no. 2869 (Ct. App. 1978).

^[13] http://elr.info/sites/default/files/litigation/17.21178.htm  Clark v. United States No. C85-97TB (660 F. Supp. 1164) (W.D. Wash. April 20, 1987) McChord AF base held liable for negligence and emotional distress for TCE contamination of drinking water wells.  TCE leached from AF golf course in Washington. AF negligence caused diminution in value of plaintiff’s property.

^[14] http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB_4-2-2010_Bulk_Fuel_Spill_GWQB_Letter.pdf; http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB_4-2-2010_Bulk_Fuel_Spill_GWQB_Letter.PDF; http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB_4-2-2010_Bulk_Fuel_Spill_HWB_Letter.PDF; ftp://ftp.nmenv.state.nm.us/hwbdocs/HWB/KAFB/Bulk_Fuels_Facility_Spill/KAFB_8-6-2010_Fuel_Spill_NOD_and_Direction.pdf

[15] http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB-12-024_5-23-2013_Disapproval_SVE_Treatment_System_WP.pdf

16 http://www.kirtland.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110719-015.pdf Light Non-Aqueous Phase Liquid (LNAPL) Containment Interim Measure Work Plan Part 1 Characterization Plan Bulk Fuels Facility Spill Solid Waste Management Units ST-106 and SS-111 July 2011(p.3-2): “Fuel transfer from the railcars to the Pump House was done under vacuum transfers. Transfer of fuel from the Pump House to the bulk storage containers was performed under pressurized conditions. Fuel-transfer infrastructure for vacuum transfers was exempt from pressure testing, whereas fuel infrastructure for pressurized transfer did undergo regular pressure testing. Only when the vacuum portion of the fuel system underwent pressure testing in 1999 was any problem noted in the fueling system.”

^[17] See fn 11.

^[18] (Albuquerque Journal, Kirtland Jet Fuel Spill ‘Significant,’ Section E, August 5,2000).  Also see fn 15.

^[19] ftp://ftp.nmenv.state.nm.us/hwbdocs/HWB/KAFB/Bulk_Fuels_Facility_Spill/KAFB_1-3-2012_Indoor_Air_Eval_WP/KAFB-011-0060c_Indoor_Air_Pathway_WP_1-12-12_ALL_BKMKED.pdf p. 3-1

^[20] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/01/177.PDF Stage 1 Abatement Plan ST-106, Kirtland AFB Bulk Fuels Facility, April 19, 2000, p.2-4:“Diesel range organics (DROs) (5.2 to 2,000 mg/kg) were detected in 12 samples and gasoline range organics (GROs) (0.22 to 360,000 mg/kg) were detected in 16 samples. The NMED action level (100 mg/kg) was exceeded in nine samples by DROs and six samples by GRO.”  “A condensate holding tank, designated as SWMU ST-341, is located at Building 1033, which is the pump house building associated with ST-106 [the fuel offloading rack]. Several RCRA investigation phases have been conducted at the ST-341 site and data from these investigations is pertinent to the overall investigation of ST-106.”

^[21] See attached map.  Also Figure 2-1 at ftp://ftp.nmenv.state.nm.us/hwbdocs/HWB/KAFB/Bulk_Fuels_Facility_Spill/KAFB_1-27-2011_Pre-Rem_SVE_Sys_OM_WP/KAFB_010_0007_r1_Pre-Remedy_Monitor_WP_02-04-2011_BOOKMARKED.pdf

^[22] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/22/2291.PDF Legal Notice June 24, 1993 adding ST-341 condensate tank as a solid waste management unit (SWMU).

^[23] http://www.epa.gov/osw/hazard/correctiveaction/resources/guidance/sitechar/rfi/rcrav1.pdf  INTERIM FINAL RCRA FACILITY INVESTIGATION (RFI) GUIDANCE May 1989, p. 3-1 procedures designed to verify suspected releases (if necessary), and to evaluate the nature, extent, and rate of migration of verified releases.

^[24] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/02/210.PDF Phase 4 RFI Report for CAU WP-339 and Environmental Monitoring Report for CAU ST-341, CAU 8-28, and CAU 8-35 (August 21, 2001), p. 3-4, section 3.3.2.3 “3.3.2.3 Previous Investigations            “Previous investigations conducted at CAU ST-341 include Environmental Compliance Assessment Management Program (ECAMP) investigations and the Appendix III Phase 1 and Appendix III Phase 2 RFIs (USAF, 1995a and 1997). During the Appendix III Phase 1 RFI in July 1994, 29 soil samples were collected from five boreholes surrounding the holding tank, one borehole near the overflow pipe outflow, and one background borehole in an area away from any known or suspected sources of contamination.            “During the Phase 2 RFI in October and November 1996, 72 soil samples and five field replicates were collected from 16 boreholes at CAU ST-341. Four boreholes were drilled or advanced by direct-push methods near the condensate holding tank, three direct-push boreholes were advanced along the overflow pipe, and nine boreholes were advanced or drilled in and around the evaporation pond.”

^[25] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/00/20.PDF RCRA Facility Investigation Report Appendix III Non-Wasteline Sites, (October 23, 1995) p.18-1. “Analytical results from the 1992 soil sample collected near the UST standpipe indicated that petroleum hydrocarbons were present in the soil at concentrations of 7,660 mg/kg and that ethylbenzene, toluene, and xylenes were present at concentrations of 52.2, 82.4, and 338 mg/kg, respectively (USAF, 1993). A follow-up visual survey by Kirtland AFB indicated that the lateral extent of soil contamination may extend a minimum of 7 ft away from the standpipe.”  https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/02/210.PDF Phase 4 RFI Report for CAU WP-339 and Environmental Monitoring Report for CAU ST-341, CAU 8-28, and CAU 8-35 (August 21,2001), p.3-4:

“The Appendix III Phase 1 RFI concluded that a contaminant release has occurred at ST-341. Petroleum hydrocarbon contamination extended to at least 12 ft below ground surface (bgs) near the holding tank and 58 ft bgs at the evaporation pond. Additional work was recommended to fully characterize the degree and extent of contamination at the site. …

“The Appendix III Phase 2 RFI also recommended that additional sampling be done near borehole ST-341-09 to determine the nature and extent of SVOC contamination. None of the previous investigations addressed potentially contaminated groundwater in the regional aquifer or in any perched groundwater.”

^[26] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/00/20.PDF RCRA Facility Investigation Report Appendix III Non-Wasteline Sites DRAFT FINAL (October 23, 1995) p. 18-4.

^[27] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/00/35.PDF FINAL NON-WASTE LINE INVESTIGATION WORK PLAN (May 1994) Section “16.3 DATA GAPS Additional soil samples are necessary to define the horizontal and vertical extent of potential soil contamination at this site.”

^[28] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/11/1189.PDF EPA comment letter (July 29, 1998), p. 005-6.“SWMU ST-341, Building 1033, Condensate Holding Tank (ST-341)The Appendix HI investigation revealed high levels of gasoline range organics (GROs) (up to 360,000 ppm) in seven boreholes. Diesel Range Organics (DROs) were also detected at high concentrations in eight boreholes. Four SVOCs were detected at concentrations exceed human health screening levels. The Phase 2 investigation included the completion of eight Geoprobe and eight hollow-stem auger boreholes. 1,1,2,2-tetrachloroethane was detected above the screening level. One Semi-Volatile Organic Compound, benzo(a)pyrene, exceeded the screening level. DROs and GROs (up to 12,000 ppm) exceeded the state UST action level to 35-37 feet below grade at the holding tank, and to 65-67 feet below grade at the evaporation pond. Jet fuel A is believed to be the predominant petroleum hydrocarbon at this site. The depth to groundwater at this site is not specified, nor is any information given concerning the proximity of this site to arroyos, etc. Kirtland should present more information on the environmental setting of this site. EPA concurs with Kirtland's recommendation that a CMS should be completed for this site. Further sampling in the vicinity of borehole ST-341-09 should also be conducted. Additionally, the extent of contamination to the east of the condensate holding tank should be determined.”

[29]  http://www.kirtland.af.mil/shared/media/document/afd-080825-042.pdf  Questions and Answers

for Fuel Leak Public Meeting: “In early 2007, the well was installed and the fuel product discovered on the groundwater.”

[30] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/23/2345.PDF

[31] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.net/sitedocs/PDFS/29%5C2917.PDF p. ES-1; See also http://newmexicomercury.com/blog/comments/what_are_our_troops_and_their_families_drinking_at_kirtland_air_force_base

[32] http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB_6-19-2013_BFFS_Weekly_Activity_Report.pdf

[33] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/00/14.PDF , p.ii and p. 4-22.

[34] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/02/0280.PDF

[35] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/17/1741.PDF EPA letter

^[36] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/01%5C144.PDF, Supplemental Information and Site Summary Report for SWMUs Recommended for No Further Action (April 1999) p.5 and 6. https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.net/sitedocs/PDFS/16%5C1651.PDF

^[37] See Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp76-c5.pdf  -- “JP-4 and JP-7 may be released into groundwaters as a result of seepage from contaminated soils during storage, aircraft maintenance, and fuel storage and dispensing operations (Twenter et al. 1985). A fuel layer of approximately 2 feet was identified in groundwater from shallow wells at Robins Air Force Base (Georgia) on a site where an undetermined amount of JP-4 was released into the soil from an underground fuel supply line in the 1960s (Air Force 1985a).

[38] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/04%5C459.PDF

[39] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/02/213.PDF Section 4.1.1

^[40] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/33%5C3382.PDF

^[41] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.net/sitedocs/PDFS/16%5C1651.PDF Quarterly Report June 2003, p. 13.

^[42] http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA297390 The Environmental Compliance Assessment and Management (ECAMP) Supplement for The Environmental Assessment Program and Management (TEAM) Guide (1995) p. 8-1 to 8-2.

^[43] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/12/1256.PDF Newly ldentified Area of Concern (AOC) Fuel Offloading Rack and http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB_7-20-2000_Additional_Stage_1_AP_reqts_ST-106.pdf

^[44] http://www.kirtland.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110719-015.pdf Light Non-Aqueous Phase Liquid (LNAPL) Containment Interim Measure Work Plan Part 1 Characterization Plan Bulk Fuels Facility Spill Solid Waste Management Units ST-106 and SS-111 (July 2011), p.4-6.

^[45] http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB_11-19-1999_Memo_Failure_Offloading_Pipeline.pdf  And look at the pictures!!

[46] http://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/cgi-bin/virtcdlib/index.cgi/821003/FID2/pubs/af/23/afi23-204/afi23-204.pdf

^[47] “While fuel tanks now have gauges and modern technology that allow officials to more closely monitor how much fuel goes in and out, Kirtland civil engineer Brent Wilson says the leak dates back to the days when ‘the way to measure was to take a long stick and dip into the tank.”  (Mr. Wilson fails to explain how personnel would dip a stick into a tank containing more than a million gallons of fuel).  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/20/kirtland-air-force-base-fuel-spill_n_1688603.html

^[48] http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB_11-16-2000_Cond_Appr_Add_Stage_1_AP_ST-106.pdf p. 1-2 NMED letter for Conditional Approval of Addendum to Stage 1 Abatement Plan ST-106 (November 16, 2000)

^[49] http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB_7-20-2000_Additional_Stage_1_AP_reqts_ST-106.pdf  Additional Requirements for Stage 1 Abatement Plan: “KAFB must determine the full vertical and horizontal extent of the JP-8 discharges reported in November 1999.  Especially in the area of of pipelines #22 and #23, sampling only along the ppeline may not be sufficient to define the full 3-D extent of the contamination.  The reason for this condition is to comply with 20 NMAC 6.2.4106.C.2.”

^[50] Albuquerque Journal, Kirtland Jet Fuel Spill ‘Significant,’ Section E, August 5,(2000).  

^[51] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/23/kirtland-air-force-base-spill_n_1537913.html

^[52] ABQ Journal, Overdue Test Finds Kirtland Fuel Leak, p.A8 (8/8/2000).

^[53] http://www.kirtlandjetfuelremediation.com/articles/KAFB-012-0035c_Phase_II_Remed_IM_Plan.pdf p. 1-2

^[54] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/15/1528.PDF “However, the sampling program should also include the goal of tagging the bottom of the plume to determine whether or not measurable contamination migration has occurred since plume boundaries were determined during earlier project phases. The current extent of the TPH plume at both site locations should be adequately defined.”

^[55] http://www.nmlegis.gov/lcs/handouts/WNR%20110812%205.%20Paul%20Robinson%20KAFB-SNL%20G'water%20Contamination.pdf

^[56]Comprehensive Site Evaluation of Bulk Fuels Area 4-3 September2004 https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/33%5C3382.PDF SECTION 4, p.4-3

^[57] http://www.kirtland.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110412-031.pdf , p.4.

^[58] http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB-12-026_3-27-2012_BFFS_In-well_treatment_disapproval.pdf

^[59] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/33/3382.PDF “CH2M Hill implemented a full-scale SVE system at ST-106 this summer after pilot testing achieved effective removal of fuel contamination at this site. It is anticipated that this SVE system, possibly with modifications, will address any remaining contamination and that No Further Action (NFA) status could be obtained within the next 3 years as the remedy nears completion.”

^[60] http://www.epa.gov/oust/pubs/tum_ch2.pdf, p. II-3

^[61] June 23, 2009 Ground Water Bureau letter https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/34/3402.PDF “3. NMED expects that off-base remediation activities, including both LNAPL recovery and dissolved-phase ground water remedial action, will be undertaken at the soonest practicable juncture. The proposed schedule does not reasonably accomplish this goal.”

^[62] ftp://ftp.nmenv.state.nm.us/hwbdocs/HWB/KAFB/Interim_Measures_WP_Part_1-FieldInvAct_BFFS/KAFB-010-0003-r0_Int_Meas_WP_rev25_11-04-2010.pdf, p.24

^[63] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.com/sitedocs/PDFS/34/3450.PDF , April 2, 2010 GWQB letter.

^[64] August 6, 2010 ftp://ftp.nmenv.state.nm.us/hwbdocs/HWB/KAFB/Bulk_Fuels_Facility_Spill/KAFB_8-6-2010_Fuel_Spill_NOD_and_Direction.pdf ;December 10, 2010ftp://ftp.nmenv.state.nm.us/hwbdocs/HWB/KAFB/Bulk_Fuels_Facility_Spill/KAFB_BFF_Workplan_Approval_with_Modifications_12-10-2010.pdf ; March 31, 2011 http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB_3-31-2011_Cover_Letter_3_WPs.pdf

^[65] http://www.abcwua.org/pdfs/wpab/wpab_minutes_051112.pdf

^[66] http://www.abqjournal.com/main/2012/12/01/news/no-kirtland-jet-fuel-in-newest-tests.html

^[67] http://www.kirtland.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-130222-079.pdf

[68] http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB-12-026_3-27-2012_BFFS_In-well_treatment_disapproval.pdf, p.5, item 6.

^[69] http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB-12-026_3-27-2012_BFFS_In-well_treatment_disapproval.pdf

^[70] http://www.kirtlandjetfuelremediation.com/articles/Quarterly_Rept_July-September%202012_TEXT.pdf p. ES-3

^[71] http://abcwua.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1224200&GUID=E0DE5496-CCF2-408B-8BF7-2FCEB28D30E5  Click on 12-14.PDF

^[72] http://www.kirtland.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110719-015.pdf, fig 4-1 (2011);
ftp://ftp.nmenv.state.nm.us/hwbdocs/HWB/KAFB/Bulk_Fuels_Facility_Spill/KAFB_3-28-2013_Quarterly_Report_Oct-Dec-2012/Figures/Qrt_Rt_Oct-Dec%202012_FIGS.pdf See figs. 5-13 to 5-15 for EDB concentrations in groundwater.

^[73] http://www.abcwua.org/pdfs/board/agenda_11_28_12.pdf See Agenda item 9.B. Resolution R-12-14.  Also, http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB_ABCWUA_12-5-2012_FS2-R-12-13.pdf

^[74] http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB-12-026_3-27-2012_BFFS_In-well_treatment_disapproval.pdf

[75] http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120730005581/en/CBI-Announces-Agreement-Acquire-Shaw-Group

[76] http://www.bizjournals.com/albuquerque/news/2013/06/11/abq-sustainable-water-supply-thru-2050.html

[77] http://www.vbprice.com/columns/ce_27.html; http://www.vbprice.com/columns/ce_14.html 

^[78] http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/documents/KAFB-12-026_3-27-2012_BFFS_In-well_treatment_disapproval.pdf

^[79] http://alibi.com/feature/38173/Superfund-Sites.html

[80] http://www.abcwua.org/pdfs/wpab/wpab_minutes_041511.pdf

[81] http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/HAC/pha/pha.asp?docid=1199&pg=1

[82] http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/HAC/pha/KirtlandAFB/KirtlandAFBHCPC07122013_508.pdf , p. 25

[83] http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/npl_hrs/hrsint.htm

[84]  https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.net/PDFS/30/3037.PDF   Landfill-001. “Interviews conducted during previous investigations implied that the landfill contained general refuse, construction and demolition debris, and, possibly, hazardous waste that included chemical drums, oil-soaked insulation, and numerous 5-gallon cans containing unspecified liquids. Photographs taken in 1971 showed numerous 55-gallon drums at this site. These materials were buried at depths ranging from 10 feet (ft) to 30 ft over approximately 49 acres. The estimated volume of the landfill was approximately 603,000 cubic yards (cy).”

https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.net/PDFS/31/3127.PDF. Landfill-02 “... metals, total petroleum hydrocarbon, semi-volatile organic compounds (SVOCs), and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) have been detected in soil samples, some at concentrations exceeding applicable action levels.”

https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.net/PDFS/30/3025.PDF Landfill-008 covers a total area of 65 acres and contains an estimated waste volume of 2,346,000 cubic yards. It is 3 combined landfills. “The city of Albuquerque and Kirtland AFB jointly operated Landfill 4 from 1964 to 1969 as a general refuse landfill, although no written records are available that confirm the type of refuse disposed.” [H]azardous materials such as arsenic, chromium, lead, benzene, and xylene were disposed…”

[85] https://kirtlandafb.tlisolutions.net/PDFS/32/3209.PDF

[86] http://radfreenm.org/pages/GroundWater.htm

[87] http://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/13%20Regular/firs/SB0135.PDF

[88] http://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/13%20Regular/firs/SB0135.PDF  The dry conditions have prompted the Office of the State Engineer and the Interstate Stream Commission to conclude that “as more time passes, and water problems increase in magnitude statewide, existing regional water plans are outdated and useless in addressing emerging water crises.”

 

[90] http://www.abqjournal.com/main/214656/news/rio-level.html

 

[92] http://www.bizjournals.com/albuquerque/blog/morning-edition/2013/05/covington-official-deal-mesa-del-sol.html?page=all

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